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I . Introduction 
This paper will treat the origi n , the characteristics, 
and the changes of the Lin-gi system in Japan . The Lin-gi 
system has been the important means of administra tion of the 
J apanese companies and adopted by most of the large companies 
of Japan.i The Lin-gi system is the product of three things . 
1 . Agricultural economy of the J apanese empire . 
2 . Confucian i deology on social orders . 
3. Western conception of industrial organization . 
Japan, like England, is an island country with a 
very limited area of arabl e land and a large expanding 
population to be fed . Originally, the Japanese indu stries 
were establ ished to help the farmers produce enough for the 
people of the country, though under the protection of the 
government, industries grew rapidly and became a means of 
military aggre ssion during the military expansion of Japan 
in Asia . 
The land, the population , and the natural resources 
of Japan are in every respect much smaller than those of 
either China or India . Yet, the success of industriali-
zation has made Japan more powerful and prosperous than 
those two countries . 
Japanese industries were once dominantly controlled 
1 
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by a few Zaibatsu, ,or family holding companies whose founders 
were closely associated with the high ranking officials of 
the government . Under the protections of the government 
these Zaibatsu grew large and powerful . They were accused 
of making possible, if not supporting, the military aggres-
sion of the Japanese empire . 2 The fatal venture of World 
War II completely wiped out the iniperiali stic army of Japan 
and destroyed the Japanese industries . To prevent any attempt 
of the Japanese Zaibatsu to become a means of future aggres-
sion, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers ordered the 
dissolution of the Japanese Zaibatsu . 3 
Two major principles of the Japanese family system 
built on the Confusian ideology of social orders have helped 
the moulding of the Lin-gi system. The two major principles 
are the feudalistic relationship between the ruler and sub-
ject and the cooperative humanity of the clan society. 
The former principle has taught the subject to humble himself 
as a c ompletely dependent subordinate whose only virtue is 
obedience, and given the hereditary authority to the ruler . 
The latter principle has oriented an individual to suppress 
himself and follow the decisions of group . In this family 
system , the juniors are taught to respectfully keep the 
seniors informed of their intended actions, and the seniors, 
in return, will customarily protect the juniors in case of 
erros resulting from the conduct of the juniors . 
1./ 
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The subordinate has no adequately delegated autho--
ri ty. Hmvever, to execute the duties of some i mportance, 
the subordinate is required to submit a documentary report . 
This documentary report, which is called the Lin-gi document, 
should be submitted to the direct department head for the 
first approval, then circulated to all the concerned depart-
ments for consultative review. Finally, it is submitted to 
the president for final decisions . 
~ Lin, which is a Japanese word written ~- means to 
report while Gi written%1, means to consult . Thus, the 
Lin-gi system is literarily an administrative procedure 
which requires the subordinates to report and consult their 
seniors in executing the affairs of some importance . Without 
an adequately delegated authority , the subordinate is required 
to seek the approval of the president of the company vrhenever 
he comes across the affairs of some importance . 
The family system, cultural backgrounds and the 
western influences all contributed to the birth and growth 
of the system. 1-:y primary purpose in the study of the 
system is to understand both the system and its backgrounds . 
It is also quite noticeable that the system is changing, for 
there are changes in attitude and way of living in Japan 
since the end of the Pacific War . 
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To the surprise of the western nations, Japan has 
recovered from the ruinous destruction of war in less than 
fifteen years . Despite the insufficient natural resources 
in the country, Japanese industries have once again risen 
up and entered the worl d market . Since J apan is so highly 
industriali zed , i ts economy strongly affects the economy of 
the vlhole of Asia which contains one half of the 1vorld ' s 
popul ation . 
II . Origin-
1 . Chinese influence 
In the year 607 A. D. the crovm prince of J apan sent 
a large official embassy to China . This embassy ru1d many 
to follovr played a vi tal role in the adoption of Chinese 
culture . The Japanese leade rs carefully chose promising 
young scholars and artists to accompany the embassies in 
order to study in China . Upon the completion of their study 
in China, they returned to Japan and became leaders in their 
own fields . These men were responsible for the successful 
tran smission to this island country of the sciences, arts , 
and ideals of the great continental civilization. 4 
Under the Chinese influence, the ancient J a·)anese 
formed their central government a f ter the model of the great 
T' ang administra tion . 5 The emperor '\lras the ab solute sovereign 
and his '\vord \vas the code of la1·1. With the Prime Einister 
and the tlinisters of Right and Lef t, a supreme counsil of 
state was organi zed to administer major affairs of the nation. 
In their administration, the seal of the Emperor wa s always 
sought in order to show that all the affairs they administered 
"YTere recognized and approved by the Ernperor . There vTel"e also 
eight ministers in charge of the respec tive fields , such a s 
ministry of interior in charge of rituals and ceremonies , 
ministry of f inance in charge of taxation and state expenditure, 
5 
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ministry of army in charge of military and defense affairs , 
ministry of engineering in charge of public works and commerce , 
and so on. Under the mini stries , scores of bureaus and offices 
were established to execute the orders of respective ministers~ 
This was a giant departmental line organization with a tremen-
dously centralized authority on the top . This was the first 
formal political institution introduced to Japan and this 
type of organization lasted in the minds of the Japanese 
people for centuries to come . Although there were some 
modifications and changes in the organization, the titles , 
yet the principles of the organization have remained . A 
similar type of organization was adopted by a number of the 
large Japanese companies, though the titles used were the 
translations of the western names . For example , in 1934 
the head office of Sumitomo Goshi Company, which is the 
Sumi tomo family holding company , was organized as follovrs . 
President: Baron Yoshizaemon Sw.itomo 
Director General Hr . Hasanori Ogura 
Managing Director Hr . Susumu Kawada 
Executive Director Kr . Junkichi Matsumoto 
Direttbr Mr . norihiko Yayo 
n Mr . Sachio Imamura 
tt :t- r . Takesaburo Akiyama 
" Mr . Nobuo Yamamoto 
Departments in the head office. 
The head of Personnel Department 
Mr. Yoshio Tanaka 
Chief of Persoanel Section 
Nr . Yoshio Tanaka ( Holding 
t\10 positions at the same time) • 
.. 
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Chief of Labor Section 
Mr . Taket sugu Watanabe 
The head of Administration Department 
Mr . Nobuo Yamamoto (, he also 
held the position of director . ) 
Chief of Commerce and Industrial Section 
Mr . Seijuro Kobayashi 
Chief of Hining Section 
Nr . Fujizo Yashi 
The head of General Affai rs Deuartment 
Chief of 
Chief of 
Chief of 
Chief of 
lnspectors: 
Chief Engineers: 
Mr . Shosaburo Kawai 
Documents Section 
lvlr . Junichi Kana 
Accounting Section 
Mr . Nahozaburo Nakada 
Realestate Section 
Mr . l asatoshi Saheki 
Hain t ena..11. c e Section 
Mr . Heihachi Masutani 
Mr . Yataro Tanaka. 
Hr. Saburo Kubomura 
Mr •. Masao Katvarnura 
Mr . Kotaro Kondou 
Mr . Takeshi Yamamoto 
Hr . Nahoe Nakamura 
lvfr . Chuji Yabe 
Military Ammunition Consultant 
Major General Hidetake Taranishi7 
Sumitomo Goshi Company was completely owned by 
four members of the Sumitomo family . The total paid- in 
capital of the company in 1934 wa s ¥-150 million (Japanese 
yen) , and the contribution of each was as follows : 
8 
Hr . Yoshizaemon Sumitomo, Capital 
¥ 147,500 ,000 
Hr . Yoshiharu Sumitomo, Capital 
¥ 1,ooo,ooo 
Hr . Kanichi Sumitomo, Capital 
¥ 1,ooo,ooo 
Hr. :t-1otoo Sumi tomo, Capital 
500,000 
Total Capital ¥ 15o,ooo,ooo 8 
According to the family code, the presidency of 
the family holding company was heredita :oy falling to the 
eldest son of the first house . The president was the 
absolute sovereign in this small economic kingdom. The 
director general , who was by theory to as sist the president 
to administer the company, in practice did execute the 
affairs of the company. 9 The director gene~al was like 
the Prime Hinister of this small kingdom while the executive 
and the managing directors were like the Ministers of Right 
and Left . In addition , there v1ere five directors , ivho were 
also the top executive officers of their subsidiary companies . 
With the director general , managing director, executive 
director, and these five directors, the council of directors 
was organized and the meeting \vas called once a week . The 
special meeting could be called at any time when needed . 
The major affairs would be presented and discussed in the 
council of directors . By procedure ., the resolutions of the 
9 
council of directors 1r1ere submitted from the managing 
director to the director general and then submitted to 
the president for the approvals . However, in practice, 
the decisions were made by the director general, for the 
president of Sunitomo Goshi Company seldom attended the 
business operation of the company. lO 
Again, in the 16th century, the periqd of ·Toku-
gawa shogunate, the study of Confucianism wa s encouraged 
by the military dictator, hoping that the political philo-
sophy a..YJ.d the moral law of the behavior of Confucianism 
i.vould foster a deep sense of loyalty to his regime and 
maintain peace and order in the society. ll, Just to give 
an idea of \•That the teachings of Confucianism v1ere, a 
brief summa ry of his ten human duties is quoted in the 
follmving. 
Kindness in the father; fili al piety in 
the son; gentility in the elder brother; 
humility and respect i n t he young er brothe r ; 
good behavior in the husband; obedience in 
the junior; benevolence i£2the ruler and loyalty in the ministers . 
This teaching of Confucianism has deep roots in the minds 
of the modern Japanese and has helped form the relation ships 
ar.10ng the family members and orders of clan ships . The 
Japanese peopl e may dress in \vestern clothes but t heir minds 
are governed by this kind of the oriental thought. These 
traditional human rela tions have contributed to the formation 
of the so called Lin-gi system . 
10 
2 · Feudalism 
J apan was under the rule of the pmverful mili-
t a ry lords f rom the 12th century to 1867.13 Conquering 
other small war lords, some strong war lords grew more and 
more pmverful a11.d finally took povTer . They tit l ed t hemselves 
"shogun" meaning Generalissimo and ruled t he country. 
The imperial court wa s preserved but it wa s without power. 
Although the court wa s in theory the source of all power 
in the state, the shogun established for himself a mi l itary 
administration loyal to him. In all the provinces, the 
shogun appointed military constables and mi l itary tax col-
lectors . The military organization was called "Bakuf'u. 11 
literally u tent offi ce" . l4 
To compensate many vlar lords for t heir assistances 
in gaining power, the shogun had to award t hem vli th fiefs 
of considerable size. These avra rded war lords were called 
" Daimyos n "i.-Thich means" Bi g Name" . Dai myos were given 
autonomy and had their ovm administration in their own 
fiefs . They maintained their own warriors and officials 
to oversee affairs within their fiefs . They formed their 
own courts vrhich were independent from the court of the 
Bakufu . The 'l.oTarriors and officials received a fixed 
hereditary salary in rice from their feudal daimyos , and 
were loyal to them. The daimyos collected taxes in rice 
from the peasants who cultivated the lands within their 
fiefs . 15 
11 
In this feudalistic society, there were four 
occupational castes . The warriors or Samurai in J apanese 
were placed at the top as the privileged ruling class. 
Farmers came next as a class of people who produced food 
for all . The third class was artisans who a lso produced 
some useful t hings for people . Merchants were despised 
and placed at the bottom for they were r egarded as not 
productive but pursuing only profits~6 According to the 
teaching of Confucianism; tt what is good for mankind 
me ans general confidence and peace. Wnat is bad f or 
mankind mean s struggle for profits, robbery, and murder . ttl7 
This biased social hierarchy wa s rigidly enf orced and 
deeply i mpressed into the minds of people. 
Although this system disappea red when the 
feudalism ended in the second pa rt of the nineteenth 
century; yet the concept of the class distinction did 
not die . It took another shape and was reflected in 
the a ristocratic society of Japan before the end of 
World War II. This concept of class distinction, which 
wa s developed fro~ the feudal i stic society, \·las also strongly 
reflected in the attitude of the management and the workers 
of the J a panese enterprises . A few points may. very well 
serve to illustrate this statement . . Family lineag e \vas 
i mportant in the selection of the management.l8 The 
presidency of the Japanese large private enterprises 
12 
was hereditary. The autocratic authority of the Japanese 
management was accepted without question by their vmrk 
force . The clerks and workers were very obedient to the 
management both in private and in business affairs . In 
the Tokugawa feudalistic society , the warrior class , who 
.were privileged to wear two swords , could take the lives 
of merchants , f a rmers, or tovmspeople with a trivial excuse 
of their own. The warriors we r e in turn forced to recognize 
the absolute ·authority of thei r barons . 
3. Agricultural 
The economy of the f eudalistic society depended 
almost entirely on agriculture . Peasants and lru1ds were 
the real backbone of thi s society. Both the central govern-
ment and the local aristocrats lived on the assesments levied 
on the lands of the peasants . l9 · The peasants under the 
ancient feudalism were serfs of. their fief-lords . The 
f a rmers of the Tokugawa era were free people and were 
allowed to t ravel from place to place and to purshase and 
sell the lands which had a tax assesment by the f ief lords . 2° 
Although there were military constables and military tax 
collectors stationed only in the l a rge towns and cities, 
there were also city elders and village chiefs . These 
honorable posts were hereditary unless they were other-
wise changed by the local ba rons . The authoriti e s of city 
elders and village chief's were based on the customary 
practices limited to settle the civil affairs of the 
13 
farmers, merchants, and t he tovmspeople.21 Members of 
Samurai( warriors) were beyond their authority. Being 
classified. as the privileged ruling class, Samurai were 
under the direct control of the fief lords. 
The system of c i ty elders and village chiefs 
developed from the clan siciety. Patriarchy is the 
common root of these t'l.vO systems of society. The 
influence of the patriarchy in the Japanese soc i ety 
is still predominant. Patriarchy has, by the same token, 
·been a ma jor force in the Japanese business organization. 
4. Awareness of Western Civilization 
The communication between J apan and abroad was 
quite active until the beginning of the first part of the 
seventeenth century. The Japanese commercial ships went 
down to the coast of China as \•Tell as to islands in the 
South Pacific . Th~ ships of Holland and Spain also fre-
quently appeared in the ports of Japan. 22 ._ The early 
foreigners who came to Japan were not limiteu to merchants 
but also religious missionaries . Unf ortunately, the 
christian missionaries '\oTere soon to face persecutions from 
the Tokugawa government . The speculated reason s were as 
follows. A local aristocra t accompanied by his f ollowers 
was sent to France a s invited envoy. Having witnessed 
the religious struggles and persecutions in the west , 
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his report to the central government on Christianity was 
not favorable . The foreign religious missionaries in 
Japan did not act with one accord, but fought among 
themselves . The missionaries were u.p.wisely involved 
in the fights of the local barons . Having been personified 
as living god , the emperor of Japan, even though powerless 
at the time, did not favor Christianity. The Tokugawa 
government feared that Christianity might cause unrest and 
disorder in a peaceful society , and began persecuting the 
foreign religion. 23 
In the second part of the seventeenth century, 
the government ordered the isolation of the country in 
order to stop the coming of the Christianity and the 
external causes of social disorder . This seclusion policy 
continued two and half centuries throughout the Tokugawa 
rule . The death penalty was imposed on the foreigners 
who entered the country without permission and Japanese 
who left the country vli thout approval from the central 
government . However, at the end of Kyushu island, there 
was a port called Nagasaki . Nagasaki was the only port 
vrhich was open and allowed the incoming of the foreign , 
ships . The foreign ships that came into this port were 
mostly from Korea, and China, and occasionally Netherlands . 24 
a . The Reopening of Japan 
The seculsion continued until 1853 when 
Commodore Perry, the Commander of the East .J:nd.ia 
Squadron of the u. s. Navy arrived at .the Uraga port of 
Japan. Commodore Perry cane to Japan \vi th four warships 
to demand a trade treaty. Perry allowed a year as a period 
of consideration for the Japanese government and sailed 
away. The Japanese government was appalled by the size 
of the ships and guns . They were also amazed by the steam 
.. 
powered vessels which could sail out against the winds and 
tides . The government realized their defenseless position 
against these foreign ships . 25 
Confronted with this problem, the Tokugawa 
government summoned some leading local barons to express 
their opinions . Having been secluded from the world, 
most of the local barons or daimyos in Japanese were 
blind to the world situation and were against any inter-
course with foreign nations . They advocated refusing 
the demands of the foreigners . A few daimyos, such 
as the dainyo of Tosa, the daimyo of Satsuma , and 
the daimyo of Choshu whose fiefs were at the south-west 
of Japan, and vJho had been , to a limited extent, in 
contact with foreigners through Nagasaki port, thought 
otherwise . 26 
The Tokugawa government learned that some 
foreign po-vrers had gained a treaty of trade in China 
by force . In 1854, Commodore Perry came back and this 
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time sailed directly into the bay of Tokyo and with his 
guns pointing to the city demanded a trade treaty. 
Overawed by the foreign powers and knowing a general 
resistance against a change of seclusion policy, the 
Tolrugawa Bakufu sought for a compromise and agreed very 
reluctro1tly to open only two ports f or foreign ships f or 
loading coal and water. Once the door had been opened, 
there was no closing to it . In a few years, three more 
ports were open and foreigners were permitted permanent 
residence both f or business needs and maintaining diplo-
matic relationships . By the second half of the 19th 
century, free and unrestricted trade relations \vere sanc-
tioned . Foreign merchants began to set up their business 
offices at the fishing village of Yokohama, which is 
now one of the most developed ports in the world . 27 
With the opening of the ports, the nation, 
which was long asleep, was now in commotion . The 
people were divided into two ma jor group s . One insisted 
strongly on - the expulsion of the foreigners and resented 
the Tokugawa Bakufu . . The other supported the Bakufu. 
The clashes of the two groups would soon lead the fall 
of the Tokufugawa Bakufu and to the regaining of supremacy 
by the imperial court . 
b . The Import of the Western Indus t rial Goods and 
the Establishment of the Companies by the Government 
and the Selected Groups . 
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Nanufacturing in J ·:tpan before the opening of the 
ports wa s confined to the products of handicraft workers 
in textile, paper, pottery, porcelain, and l acquer ware . 28 
It was after the opening of the ports that western machines 
began to pour .into Japan . In 1860's unres:tricted trade 
relations were sanctioned , and foreign merchants began 
to set up their branch offices in Japan. It was through 
these f oreign merchants that the Japanese purchased their 
first m ..,_ c ~lines . Amazed by the suueriori ty of i r:morted 
commodities and the industrial strength of the western 
nations, the government and people of J apan were anxious 
to have their own industries so tha t they could build up 
their economic strength. Industrialization requires large 
capital. and necessary scientific knowledge • • Thus, the 
government and a handful of pol itical elite and wealthy 
merchants started organizing companies and factories by 
hiring speciali sts from the western nations. 
In 18 55, the King of Netherland gave a steamship 
of anproximately 250 tons to the Tokugawa Bakufu as a gift 
to secure the good will of the regime and maintain the 
privileges of commerce through Nagasaki port . The Dutch 
government also dispatched several of their naval officers 
to take up the naval education and organize a naval force 
for the Bakufu , and help construct shipyards . In 1856, 
eleven Dutch engineers with their machines tools arrived 
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in Japan. Due to the unsatisfactory preparation of suf-
ficient funds, this construction continued several years 
and finally a shipyard was built in 1861. Upon the com-
pletion of the shipyard the Dutch engineers went home and 
the shipyard was deserted . The optimistic attitude of the 
Dutch officials changed when they learned that the Tokugawa 
Bakufu made the trade treaties with the United States, 
England , and France respectively . The Tokugawa Bakufu 
switGhed to deal with France . 
Realizing that a naval port in Japan would, 
in future , benefit French Pacific Fleet greatly , the 
French officials gladly welcomed this deal. Monsieur 
Franc9is Leon Verny , who had been e1, ployed to build naval 
guns in Shanghai , China, was reconunended to the Tokugawa 
Bakufu. His special assingment from the Bakufu was to 
build a large shipyard in Yokosuka, Japan. This location 
was selected by this French specialist. The French autho-
rity helped Nonsieur Verny enthusiastically. They recruited 
many French engineers and tec~Dicians . In 1866 , all the 
personnel, machines, tools, materials, and other necessary 
facilities for constructing shipyards arrived in Japan . 
The construction of necessary plants, work shops, steel 
'"orks and so on was soon underway. At the end of the 
same year, the construction of a 30 horse powered steamship 
and a 10 horse pO\-lered steamship began. This was the fi:sst 
19 
shipyard for building steamships in the country and its 
operation '\vas controlled by the government . 29 
In the textile industry, the lord of Satsuma , 
Nariakira Shimazu, who was then one of the most powerful 
lords in the country, purchased t1..ro i mported spinning 
machines operated with hydrauli c power , and installed them 
in his Kagoshima Spinning Plant in 185?'. After his death, 
the spinning plant was deserted . In 1864, his successor 
noticed again the need of having a spinning factory . As 
a result, twenty youths were selected and sent to England 
to study the modern methods of operating the spinning 
factory •. LD agreement was negotiated between these Japanese 
youths and Pratt Company of England, in which Pratt Company 
was to provide the design of a spinning factory in J apan 
and install all the necessary spinning machines for this 
company. Pratt Company was also obliged to instruct these 
Japanese youths in the operation of the spinning machines . 
By 1867 , the English engineers and machines arrived in Japan. 
Soon the factory was constructed and the machines installed . 
The factory started operation but the English engineers did 
not stay long, for they dtd not like the cotmtry despite 
the f act that they were paid very well .3° 
A model telegraph was brought to Japan by Commodore 
perry and the demonstra tion of the model arous <::ld sensational 
interest among the Japanese people . The Tokugawa Bakufu. 
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was very much interested in the purchase of the electrical 
telegraph but the political commotion in this period of time 
prevented the realization of their wish. Mr . Henry Branton 
of England, who was once asked to purchase the electrical 
telegraph for the Tokugawa Bakufu, was now to purchase the 
same equipment for the nBw imperial government of Japan. 
He also recruited Mr . George M. Gilbert, a distinguished . 
telegraphic engineer. Both the engineer and the purchased 
telegraphs reached Jap·an in 1869. 1- r. Gilbert soon constructed 
a trial line in the city of Yokohama and the trial was very 
successful . He also trained fou r selected Japanese youths 
to be telegraphic engineers . In 1873, the Central Telegraph 
Bureau was inaugurated.31 
Along ,.,i th the model telegraph, Commodore Perry 
brought a model of trains to Japan as the gifts to the 
Tokugawa Bakufu. This model of trains was displayed for 
public exhibition, and the Japanese people were very much 
amazed by this moving train. In 1865, the Tokugawa Bakufu 
negotiated with the minister of the Embassy of the United 
States an agreement of constructing a railroad in Japan. 
However, due to the political changes, the agreement was 
not carried out. In 1871 the Japanese government entrusted 
the first project of constructing a railroad between Yokohama 
and Tokyo with the Oriental Bank. In March 1871 , the 
engineers and architects recruited from England reached 
21 
Japan . On !"arch 25, 1871 , the survey work betwee.n Tokyo 
and Yokohama began. On May 1872, the construction of the 
railroad between Tokyo and Yokohama was completed . This 
railroad , the first ever built in Japan , was ovmed by the 
government and operated by the bureau of railroad that was 
later expanded to become Japan National Railroad Company. 32 
The est :-i. blishment of the first steel mill at Yahata 
Village 1.-ra s formally announced on June 1 , 1897. For the 
c9nstruction of this steel mill , ¥ lo,ooo , ooo was appropriated 
from the reparation of China . l1r . Ishiro Kazuta '\<Tas appointed 
Director of the steel mill by the order of the Prime 1inister 
of the country. He was responsible for organizing and re -
cruiting all the personnel needed for the steel mill . At 
that time , there were very few people in Japan \>Tho had the 
knowledge of steel production. Thus , many German engineers 
and foremen were recruited vTi th very handsome '\vages to direct, 
to instruct and to run the steel mill . :Hr . Gustav Toppe was 
hired as chief engineer with an annual pay of ¥ 19 , 200 which 
vla s t\vice a s much of the pay of the Japanese Prime hinister 
at that time . In addition , a very beautiful mansion wa s 
provided , and the travelling expenses were paid. Mr . Carl 
Hasse and 1:-ir . Herman Robberg were each paid ¥ 10,000 annually . 
There were all togather seven German engineers and seven 
foremen working in the steel mill . 
In March , 1897, six J~panese university graduates 
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were selected and sent to Germany to specialize in steel 
production, and inthe summer of the same year, the cons-
truction of the steel mill began. In February, 1901, the 
construction was in some part completed and the first 
production started . The planned production was 90 , 000 tons 
annually but the production of the first day was merely 
10 tons . Gradually the methods of the production were 
improved and t ne production 'vas increa sed . In 1904, 
the steel mill wa s able to produce 32 , 503 tons of pig iron; 
61 , 980 tons of ferro-alloys; and 41,329 tons of steel 
products . This was the first steel mill in Japan and 
was owned and operated by the government . The military 
build- up and industrialization of the country pushed the 
growth of Yahata Steel Mill to become the fir st and the 
largest steel mill in the country • . ,:In 1934, Japan Steel 
Corporation was organized by merging Yahata Steel Hill ( ow11ed 
by the government) ; Kamaishi Hining( ovmed by Hit sui Zaibatsu ); 
J:.i itsubishi Steel( ovmed by Hitsubishi zaibatsu); Fuji Steel( 
owned by Shibusawa Zaibatsu); and Kyushu Steel ( owned by 
Yasukawa Zaibatsu )• From this time , Yahata Steel Hill vias 
no longer solely owned by the government . In 1950, the 
Supreme Commander of Allied Powers ordered the split of 
Japan Steel Corporation and the result was the birth of 
Yahata Steel Company and Fuji Steel Company. Both Yahata 
Steel Company and Fuji Steel company are now two of the 
l argest steel producers in Japan. -33 
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Hany kinds of materials, such as cement, bricks, and 
paint used. in the construction of factories v1ere not pro-
duced in J anan at that time . These materials had to be : 
imported from European produce r s . How·ever, these materials 
were too bulky and too heavy to be transported over such 
a long distance . Besides, the shipping cost was tremendous . 
The J apanese government started hiring European engineers 
to establi sh the factories and to train their workers for 
manufacturing these materials in Japan . In 1887, the first 
brick manufacturing com ~any was organized . All manufacturing 
machines , such as drying machines, model f orming machines , 
and wheel ovens were imported . Mr . Carlos I def onso Nasentes 
Ziese, an American of German descendant, wa s hired as chief 
engineer of this company, Japan Brick Company . 34 
In 1872, the Bureau of Construction of J apan 
built their f t rst cement plant at Fukagawa with the assistance 
of English engineers . Glass h d been known long before the 
opening of the ports but was not used as a construction 
material . In 1873 , the demand of the construction really 
pushed the idea of plate production in the country. In 
this very yea r , a glass manufacturing como any 1-1as organized 
and its manufacturing plant was constructed at Shinagawa 
section of Tokyo city, Japan . To construct t l1is plant, 
Kogyosha , which was the name of the conpany, invited 
Nr . Thoma s Worton, an English engineer, to direct and 
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to supervise the construction work . All the materials and 
machines f or the factory were i mported from England . Due 
to the unsuccessful production and mismw~agement , the 
ownership of the company vla s transf' ered. from the private 
individuals to the government . l<Ir . Thomas \vorton left the 
company and later three fore i gn engine ers were successi vely 
empl oyed. The name of the company was changed to Shinagawa 
Glass Manufacturing Plant. 35 
Unlike the small stores owned by one or more 
private individuals, the companies om1ed by the government 
were large in size and requ i red formal procedures and a lot 
of paper work in their operation. Being o~med by the 
government and having the monopolistic privileges , these 
companies did not have much difficulty in marketing or 
finances . Their major problems were rather efficiency 
in production and control in operation. The long-range 
planning or the business policy for:mulation was not much 
required of the management of these companies . But they 
emphasize greatly on the control of daily administration. 
The increase of production , and efficiency in operation 
vTere the main concern of the management of these comp anies • 
.At that time, ther.e vTere not many scienf ific methods of 
control known to the management . In order to direct and 
control the works of their subordinates in the business 
operation , the management ad opted the Lin-gi system which 
required the subordinates to report to the senior officers 
on the cases of some importance and get approvals from the 
top management before they treat the cases. Depending on 
this system , the m~~agement administer t heir operations . 
Host of these government owned companies were later 
transfered to the management of the private individuals and 
the Lin-gi system came with them. Following are t1.vo examples 
Of how the government owned companies were transfered to the 
private management . 
In 1874, a few Japanese sailors were shipwrecked 
on the island of Formosa and were.killed by the aborigines. 
This incident caused the Japanese government to dispatch 
an expeditionary array to the isLmd . In order to ship 
military goods across the sea , the Jananese government 
bought 13 ships an<3. leased to Mr.' Yataro Iv1aza.ki, who was 
then appointed to transport the military cargoes . This 
arrangement was m·de for him by his friends, Hr . Shojiro 
Goto and Nr. Toshimi tsu Okubo , 'l.vho -vrere then very pov1erful 
government officials . Hr . Dlazaki at that time was the owner 
of a small shipping company called Hitsubishi Shipping Company. 
In 1875, the government asked him to open a re gular service 
line betl•reeri Shanghai, China, and Yokohama, Japan, in the 
hop~ that Japan 1.vould oust the shipping companies of the 
·western n ations from the area and monopolize the shipp i ng 
service in the far east . To achieve this aim, the J apanese 
government gave its full support to Mi tsubis):;d Shipping 
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Company mvned by Hr . Yataro Iwazaki. Annually, the Japanese 
government gave ¥ 265,000 to compensate Mitsubi shi Shipping 
Company for openning the service line at the government 's 
request . ¥ 265,000 wa s very large amount of money a t that 
ti~e . In addition, the _g ove~nment transfered all the steam-
ships mvned by Japan Eail Steamship Company to Hr. Ivlazaki . 
Japan Hail Steamship Co:r.1pany was organized vlith the joint 
capital of the government and the Nitsui family in equal 
shares . The governn1ent compensated the Vutsui family with 
money and turned these 18 ships over to r . Iwazaki's company. 36 
In reality , Japan Hail Steamship Company was transfered to 
Hr . Yataro Iwazaki without any compensation, f or Mr. Iwa zaki 
paid nothing to the government . On the contra ry, Hr . I ·Tazaki 
received very consi derable f t nancial and legislat i ve pro-
tections in his business operations . With such super ior 
conditions, Er . I1,1azaki .pushed his business in many fields 
and accumulated a tremendous .... realth. By the turn of the 
century, l-1itsubishi Company had alre ady become one of the 
l a r gest zaibatsu , a fami l y o-vmed holding company, in the 
count r y . In 1930, Nitsubi shi Comnany had approximately 
100 subsidia ry companies with a total paid-in capital of 
¥ 590,ooo,~oo . 37 
r'~iike Coal !·line wa s originally owned by the government 
and Nr . Takuma Dan, a nine specialist, was appointed in 
charge of the operation of this mine . In his youth, Mr. Dan 
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was chosen to study the engineering of mining at Boston 
Institute of Technology. In 1878, he graduated from the 
institute and went back to Japan. In 1884, he was put in 
charge of Miike Coal Hine, 1.-1hich was one of the largest 
coal mines in the country. With the special favor of Baron 
Inoue, 1;.rho was then the minister of finance, and Viscount 
Hirobumi Ito, I•Jho was then the minister of industry, Hitsui 
Busan Company, a ma jor subsidiary company of Mitsui Zaibatsu, 
was grru1ted the sole agency to sell the coal produced by 
Hiike Coal Mine . Hope of profit induced Director general 
of Mitsui Zaibatsu, Mr . Masuda , to negotiate the purchase 
of lYliike Coal }1ine from the government . _Again, with the 
help of Baron Inoue, Miike Coal Nine with N~ . Dan, the mine 
specialist, was transfered to l'Jfitsui Zaiba tsu . With ·the 
capital of the Mitsui Zaibat su , Mitsui Mining Company was 
organized and Mr . Dan was made head of the newly organized 
concern. The rich reserve of the mine· and the capability of 
Hr . Dan made the operation of Mitsui 1-lining Company very 
profitable . 38 
III . The Rise of' Zaibatsu and Their Companies. 
1 . Financial Assistance to the Imperial Court . 
When the i mperial court regained the political 
power, it was destitute~39 The imperial court was given 
only 30,000 koku of rice annually in the Tokugawa Bakufu 
administration. The Tokugawa Bakufu returned the poli-
tical power along with an empty treasury box. Yet there 
were expensive affairs of state piling up to be executed. 
In 1867, Mr . Tomomi Iwakura , the court noble, 
asked the wealthy merchants of Kyoto area to contribute 
some money . Mr . Hachiroemon Mitsui, Mr . Zensuke Ono, 
and Mr . Saburosuke Simada contributed 3,000 ryo( Japanese 
silver units) . Mr . Iwakura, a court noble, soon set up 
a bureau of treasury in charge of the financial affairs 
of the government . He also appointed Mitsui , Ono, Simada 
as government financial agents who would take care of the 
financial transactions of the govern~ent, including cashing 
the government 's notes and undertaking the government's loans. 
In February, 1868, the young emperor was to make his first 
visit to Osaka and a fund of 50,000 ryo was needed. 
Mitsui , Ono, Simada, and many other wealthy merchants 
were asked to contribute the needed funds . _ In April 
of the same year, the new government was in need of 
another 500,000 ryo for t aking over the Edo Castle, the 
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present Emperor's pala~e, and other administrative ex-
penditures. Mitsui , Ono, and Simada were again asked to 
contribute or raise it. The new government depended 
almost entirely upon these financial agents for financial 
needs . !:rO 
2. Politics and Finance 
Having helped financially in the establisrunent 
of the new government , the !·fitsui family was always closely 
associated with the politicians of the nation. In the 
beginning era of the l eiji government , Baron Kaoru Inoue, 
who was then .the minister of finance, helped the Nitsui 
family to found a bank( Nitsui Bank ) and gave as much 
assistance as he could . In 1873, Baron Inoue was forced 
to resign from the ministry of finance and organized for 
himself a business firm engaged in the international trade. 
This company exported silk, tea, and imported arms, rice, 
and fertilizers. But in 1876, Baron Inoue was recalled to 
the political office and the company wa s di ssolved. 
Upon the request of the Hitsui family, he turned over his 
executive personnel to the I-1i tsui family for the purpose 
of organizing and administering Mitsui Busan Co:r.1panyr. 
With the privileges and protection from the new government ,. 
this company grew very rapidly and later became a giant 
subsidiary company of the Mitsui Zai batsu. With the special 
arrangement of Baron Inoue and Viscount 'Ito, the minister 
of industry and later the prime minister of the nation, 
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Hiike Coal l1ine was transferred to the .itsui family. 
This gave birth to Mitsui ining Company, which was 
also a giant subsidiary company of the Hitsui Zaibatsu . 
As to his assistance to the Mitsui family, Baron Inoue 
explained that it was neither for his own benef it nor 
for the Mitsui family's sake, but rather for the welfare 
of the nation that motiva ted him. He said that the 
financial strength of the ~itsui family and the contri-
butions that the Mitsui family made to the new government 
were so great that the prosperity and adversity of the 
l 
Mitsui family had a great i mpact on the nation~s economy. 
Through Baron Inoue, the Hitsui Zaibatsu became the financial 
backer of Seiyukai, a political party organized in 1900 
and since then the Nitsui Zaibatsu has been deeply 
involved in Japan's politics . 41 
3. Mitsui Zaibatsu, the Largest and the Typical 
A zaiba tsu is a family owned holding company 
or financial clique . This term did not exist in Japan 
bef ore her ports were forced open f or business \vi th the 
western world . The western ships brought not onlY.:· the 
industries but also capitalism to Japan. With the 
enthusiastic support of the new government and the 
assistance of western scientists, some weal thy merchants 
were able to organize enterprises, and began developing 
domestic industries . In order to develop domestic 
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industries in competition to those of· wester.n nations, 
the Japanese government gave financi al as well a s legis-
l a tive protection to these domestic concerns , especially 
to a few family concerns which had given assistance at 
the time of establishing the new government. These 
off icially nrotected families soon grew in wealth and 
influence . 
By concentra ting the famil~r wealth in a parental 
company, the se f~,., families' founded most of the l arge 
financial institutions, owned the most of the largE:; 
industri al enterprises, and dominantly controlled the 
service business in the country . 
A pa rental company is f ormed by the concentrated 
capital of a fevt members of a family . Thus, the Mitsui 
Gomei Company was owned exclusively by eleven members of 
the Mitsui House , and Mitsubishi Goshi Company wa s owned 
completely by two members of the Iwazaki f amily. A pa rental 
company may own several or more of direct subsidi a ry companies 
of giant size , and each of these subsidiary companies ~ay, 
in turn , own tens of its own subsidi a ry companies of 
dif ferent line . In addition to these vertical connections 
with the parental company , all these companies may extend 
their con~rol horizontally over many out siders by patronizing 
their products or service, giving long term loans, or holding 
their preferred stocks . 
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According to primogeniture system which prevailed 
in Japan , the presidency of the parental company is hereditary 
to the eldest son of the first house . Beneath the pre-
sident, there are the director gene~al, executive directors, 
and several directors in the parental company. The se 
directors form a committee, which is the real policy maker 
of the zaibatsu . The members of the directors are not 
necessarily the members of the zaibatsu fa11ily. In f act, 
they are mostly promoted from the top executives of their 
subsidiary companies for their abil i ty and service . The 
top executives of the subsidiary companies are in theory 
elected by the shareholders of their respective companies . 
Since the parental company is the l a rgest shareholder, and 
sometime is the sole O\ine r of these subsidiary companies, 
the president , the director general, and the several 
directors of the parental company has the deci sive voice 
in the election of the officers of the subsidiary companies. 
There were more than a dozen zaibatsu in Japan 
before the end of World War I I. Among them, Mitsui Zaibatsu 
is the largest and the most typical of all . Following is 
a short story of Nitsui Zaibatsu and a list of its companies . 
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4 . A Short Story of the l1itsui Zaibatsu 
The founder of the Hitsui Zaibatsu was 
Mr . Takatoshi Hachiroemon Vutsui , who was born in 1621. 
The youngest son in the family, he came to work in his 
elder brother's shop in Edo, the capital of the Tokugawa 
regime . He did not stay in his brother's shop long but 
was soon called back to the home at Echigo to attend on 
his old mother . At the age of 52, he was, then for the 
second time, allowed to go to Kyoto, the city in vlhich 
the imperial court was located, and opened an apparel 
store named Echigoya . In the same year or 1673, he 
also opened another apparel shop in Edo(Tokyo), which 
he also named Echigoya ~ The Echigoya stores developed 
into depall"tment stores and the name was changed to 
Mitsukoshi Department Store which is now a corporation 
owned completely by Mitsui Gomei Company and is the 
largest department store in Japan. Mitsukoshi Department 
Store Corporation grossed approximately ~ 45,338,ooo,ooo ( 
Japanese yen) or $ 140,000,000( u.s . dollars) in 1959 and 
had 6,816 employees.42 
In 1691, Mitsui opened a currency exchange in 
Edo, and soon became the authorized money changer for the 
Tokugawa Bakufu . Originally, the land tax w•s paid in 
rice . The rice assessed in the area of the western realm 
was sold in Osaka city by the Tokugawa Bakufu officials 
stationed in Osaka . Then ' the money realized from the sale 
of rice was transported by armed warriors to Edo where 
the Tokugawa Bakufu resided . The shipment of money between 
Edo and Osaka was too costly and risky . As an authorized 
money changer, Nr . Hitsui was asked to take up this trouble-
some duty without pay. In theory, the treasurer of Tokugawa 
Bakufu stationed in Osaka would entrust a certain amount 
of money to the authorized money changer in Osaka, who 
would, in a period of ninety days , transport the money 
. 
' to Edo and deliver the money to the head treasurer in Edo . 
However, upon receipt of the money from the treasurer in 
Osaka , Mr . :t-1itsui was wise enough to utilize this money 
to· purchase commercial goods which he would ship to Edo 
for sales . s soon as the commercial goods reached Edo, 
he would sell all the goods to the city merchants and 
realize a substantial profit . He was obliged to r emit 
only the amount entrusted , and so he would retain the 
prof it he made through the transaction. The apparel 
stores and the money changer operations a l so yielded 
very good profits . In years he was able to accumulate 
money to such an extent that he became the most wealthy 
merchant in the country . 
In 1866, the Tokugawa Bakufu ordered the 
Vitsui family to contribute 1, 5oo ,ooo ryo to assist 
the Bakufu to organize an a rmy to fight Choshu lord . 
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The demand did not allow any refusal. It was also too 
large an amount to be paid on short notice . The Hitsui 
family was deeply perturbed and began looking for ways 
to conpromise . Hr . Lizaemon lvlinomura , who was then 
very famous for his ability in diplomacy and a close 
friend of Lord Koguri, who was in charge of finance for 
the Bakufu , was i nvited to make this deal for the Nitsui 
family. A. negotiation was mad e and the 1'<1i tsu;i family 
immediately·paid one fifth of the demand and the remainder 
was put off to a later period \vhich never arrived . This 
negotiation saved the Hitsui family from such a financeial 
burden which might have vliped out their wealth . Nr . Lizaemon 
Minomura al so made the Mitsui family associated with the 
high officials of the Meiji government , who would, very 
consequentially , be helpful to the development of the 
Nitsui family companies . 43 
Just before the end of World War II, the i"' i t sui 
Zaibatsu had approximately 300 subs i diary and associated 
companies . 44 The parent al company of the Hitsui Zaibatsu 
was Ni tsui Gomei Company , vlhich wa s totally owned by 
e leven members of the Mitsui family, but was dissolved 
by the order of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers . 
Hi tsui Gomei Company m·med thirteen direct subsidiary 
companies, nanely 1·itsui Busan, Hitsui 11ining , Toshin 
Warehouse , Mitsui Bank, Mitsui Trust, Mitsui Life Insurance, 
Tokyo Shibaura( known as Toshiba), Hokkaido Coal ~ine and 
Steamships, Nettai Sangyo , Nihon Seikosho, Taiwan Colonial 
Tea, Onoda Cement, and Denki K~gaku Kogyo . k nong these 
thirteen subsidiary companies, Mitsui Busan, Mitsui Bank, 
and Nitsui Nining are the major three . 45 
Japan's first National Bank was established in 
1873 \1i th a capital of 2. 5 million yen. Mit sui and Ono 
families each paid one million yen and the rest was col-
lected from many individuals . It v.ras Mr . Lizaer10n Hinomura 
who helped 1itsui to negotiate the establishment of the 
first National Bank with Baron Kaoru Inoue, who was then 
the minister of finance of the new government . The ~titsui 
family used to operate money exchange and therefore, the 
trade of finance was not totally strro1ge to them. However , 
lacking the foundation of modern business conceptions, and 
being too much involved with personal emotions, the bro1k 
was soon loaded with dangerous amount of uncollectible 
loans to influencial politicians and insolvent firms . 
This was a serious operational problem to the bank. 
Baron Inoue, the minister of finance and a political 
patron of the Hitsui Zaibatsu, recommended a aapable 
youth by the name of Nakamigawa . Mr . Hikojiro Nakamigawa 
was educated in England and 'l:rorked for a few years for 
government . Mr . Nakamigawa was given the position of 
vice president to cope with the problems in the bank. 
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He took a tough measure . He threatened to make known 
to the public the overdue debts of the politicians and to 
sue them in the court , if they would not pay back the long 
overdue loans . He collected the outstanding loans and 
firmly refused to extend loans to any politicians who still 
had overdue debts to the bank. He also notified the com-
panies to pay back their overdue loans from the bank or 
the bank would take over the management of the companies . 
He did mean what he said and took over the operations of 
the companies which defaulted in paying back the debts . 
In order to take over the management of these companies, 
he recruited many able managers, such as J:. r. Daita Fujiyama, 
Hr. Nariakira I keda , Nr . Ginjiro Fujiwara, Hr . Sanji l'1uto , 
Nr . Shogoro Hatono , . r . Eiji sabuki, and many others . 
Some of them succeeded Mr. Nakamigawa as the chief executive 
of the Nitsui Bankand some became the chief executive of 
the subsidiary companies . 
It was Mr . : ikojiro Naka.migawa who saved the 
l itsui Bank from the operational difficulties, firmly 
established the appropriate practices of the bank, and 
advanced the Mitsui family from the commercial concerns 
to the industrial enterprises . He gave the Hitsui merchants 
their industrial strength, which contributed greatly to 
the industrial development of Japan . ~6 
The Eitsui Bank is still ranked as the seventh 
largest bank in Japan with 100 branches all over the 
country. It has a capital of 9 billon yen and has a 
deposit of approximately 45e billion yen.47 As a financial 
institution of a Zabatsu, the Mitsui Bank offers financial 
services to all the subsidiary companies of the Litsui 
Zaibatsu. Through this bank, Eitsui also extends their 
influence over the enterprises of the government and other 
individuals . 48 
The grovrth of vTeal th of the Ni tsui faJUily was 
centered on the operation of financial institution in the 
early periods, and yet, commerce, mining, and heavy industry 
all accelerated its development . 
Hitsui Busan Company, a subsidiary company of 
~itsui Gomei Company, is itself a holding company with 
more than 4o sibsidiary companies in various fields, 
such as Toyo Rayon Company in textile indust~y, Taisho 
darine and Fire Insurance in the insurance business, 
Japan Flour in agricultural products, Far East Dairy 
Company in dairy products, Tokyo Gauge Company and 
\ 
Samki Kogyo Company in machine ry. Nitsui Busan also 
has many branch officers all over the world . As an 
i mporter and exporter, .1-fitsui Busan Company used to 
have approximately 20 % of the nation 1 s total import 
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and export . 49 In 1960, 1-fi tsui Busan had a sales of 640 
billion yen ( nearly 2 billion u. s. dollars) \vith a nwnber 
of 6 , 5JO employee~ . 50 
Mitsui Busan Company was originally founded by 
r . Takashi Hasuda , v1ho visited France in his youth and 
learned English from the foreign missionaries at Yokohama. 
In 1872 , Baron Inoue resigned from his post as minister of 
finance and opened a business firm engaged in international 
trade . Mr. Hasuda was vrorking for Baron Inoue in this firn . 
In 1876, Baron Inoue \vas recalled to the ministry of finance 
and the firm was dissolved . The Nitsui fami l y then took 
the opportunity and organized Hitsui Busan and requested 
Baron Inoue to recommend some capable personnel to run 
the ne\vly organized company. Mr . Hasuda and some of his 
associates \vere then recommended to this Mitsui Busan 
Comp:1ny by Baron Inoue . Before the organization of lli tsui 
Busan Company, the busine s s activities of l·iitsui Zaibatsu 
were limited to the domestic market . Mitsui Busan Company 
made the llitsui Zaibatsu enter the world market . With the 
speci al favor of Baron Inoue , a..r1d Viscount Ito, Mit sui Bus an 
Company vlas made the sole agent to sell the coal produced 
by the government owned Niike Coal Hine . Through Mitsui 
Busan Company , this coal was exported to Shanghai, Hong Kong , 
and Singapore • • 
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As the textile industry developed rapidly 
in J apan , the demand for cotton increased sharply •. 
Mitsui Busan Company soon engaged in the purchase of 
cotton from India and China . From Pratt Company of ~ 
England, Mitsui Busan also gained the privileges of Far 
Eastern agency to sell the spinning machines produced by 
Pratt Company. Mitsui Busan soon began to have branch 
offices in abroad . With the expansion of J apan 's military 
power abroad, Nitsui Busan grew larger and larger . 
In 1881, Mr . Masuda , who wa s promoted to the 
director general of the Mitsui Zaibatsu, negotiated with 
the government the purchase of Miike Coal Mine mmed by 
the government . The Miike Coal 1<ine and Hr . Takuma Dan , 
a mine specialist , ware tr~sferred to the Mitsui Zaibatsu 
and then Mit sui l-Uning Company was organized . The 1iike 
Coal Mine \vas changed into the Mitsui Mine, and Hr . Takuma 
Dan was made to head Mitsui Mining Company . The rich 
reserve of the Hitsui Mine and the capability of Hr. Dan 
made the operation of Mitsui Mining Company very profitable . 
For opera-tional convenience and expansion , Mitsui Hining 
Company gradually acquired a dozen of su.bsidiary compa nies 
including a hydroelectric power company, several coal 
mining companies and a f ew chemical companies . 5l 
The coal production of }1i tsui !-'lining Company and 
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the associa ted comuanies of Hitsui Zaibatsu reached more than 
a quarter of t he national coal production in the prewar era. 
11i t sui Go r:1ei Company, t he pa rental company of the Mit sui 
Zaiba t su, wa s supported by t hese three giant subsidiary 
companies and o'l;med several large i ndust rial companies , such as 
Toshiba, Ni hon Seiko , Onoda Cement, Denki Kagaku Kogyo . 
5. A List of Companies Belonging to the Mitsui Zai ba t su . 
In order to give an idea of size of a zaiba tsu, a list 
of t he comuani es of the Hitsui Zai bat su with one million or 
more yen of paid- in capital shall be presen ted, excluding 
those operating primarily in the J apanese sphere of conquest 
bef ore World War II . Actually , the Hitsui Zaibat su had more 
than 300 subsidia ry and af fili a te compani es with approximatel y 
3,ooo,ooo employees in its prime . 52 
TABLE 1 
THE SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATE COHPANIES 
OF THE NITSUI ZAIBATSU 
WITH ONE MILLION OR NORE OF PAID-IN CAPI T_ L53 
Paid- in Capital 
Name of Comuanies (million of Yen) 
Mit sui Real Estate 
Mitsui Chemical 
Precision Machinery 
Mitsui Lumber 
Ka1:r1ai shi luning 
Sanki Industrial 
.it sui Coas t11i se Shipping 
Nit sui Vla rehouse 
Mitsui Agr i cul t ure and 
Forestry 
5 
101 
100 
30 
20 
17 
15 
12. 5 
10 . 5 
Controlled by 
all 1-iit sui 
i n terests %. 
100 
99. 8 
99. 6 
100 
100 
96. 8 
99. 6 
100 
99 . 9 
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TABLE 1 ( continued ) 
Name of Companies 
Paid-in Capital 
(million of yen) 
Hitsui Wooden Shipbuilding 
Sangyo Oil & Fat 
Taiyo Kogyo s. s. 
Horai Tanker Co . 
Setonaikai Shipping 
Tokyo Rubber 
Tokyo Synthetic Chel· ical 
Hokkaido Sulphur 
Toyo Hosiery 
Toyo Hachinery 
Total 96-100% control 
72 to 89 % of control 
Mitsui s. s. Line 
Hit sui Shipbuilding 
Oriental Cotton Trading 
Toyo Soda Industrial 
Toyo Kaiun s. s. 
Saikai s. s. 
Hokkai s. s. 
Yamato Coal luning 
Nippon Zink Hining 
Bibai Partnership 
Oriental Elect. Furnace 
Ninshin Steel 
Ogura Exploitation 
Mitsui Life Insurance 
Total 72 to 89 % 
50 to 69 ~ of control 
Hitsui hining Co 
Hitsui Busan 
Electric Chemical 
Taisho Marine & Fire Insur. 
Nippon Flour 
Yuesa Storage Battery 
Sanki Aviation 
Takeda Machine Industry 
Matsushima Coal Mining 
10 
10 
20.6 
10. 2 
1.3 
~ 
2.25 
2 
2 
378 
70 
45 
35 
30 
18 . 4 
13. 2 
5. 2 
7. 5 
~ 
2. 5 
2 
1 
0.5 
237 
300 
100 
60 
23 
16 
8.15 
4 
3. 5 
2 
Controlled by 
all 1i tsui 
interest % 
100 
100 
97.6 
99 . 75 
97. 7 
100 
100 
98. 8 
98 . 7 
99 . 5 
72 . 8 
87 . 9 
88 . 3 
74.4 
84.9 
78 .2 
89 . 7 
86. 9 
85. 9 
75 
76 . 5 
76 . 5 
78 . 6 
75 
67 . 8 
52. 9 
66 . 9 
50 . 7 
53 
51 .1 
50 
50 
50 
TABLE 1 ( continued ) 
Paid-in Capital 
Name of Companies (million of yen) 
Safety Cableway 1 . 2 
Nippon Yeast 1 
Sanrin Anthracite 1 
Total 5o to 69 % 
30 to ~9 % of control 
Hokkaido Colliery & 
Steamship Co . 
Toyota Hotor Co . 
1'1aruzen Petrol eum 
Toyo High Pressure 
Eitsui Light 1etal 
Shm.·ra Aircraf t 
Kawasaki Wharf 
Toyo Rayon 
Daito Woolen 
Nippon Hetal 
Taiheiyo Coal 
Fukushima Mining 
Yli t sui Trust 
Heiji Steamship 
Tropi cal Produce 
Nasu Aluminum 
Asahi Heavy Industry 
·Iunakata Indust r i al 
Toa El ectric I ron 
Total 30 to 49 % of 
control 
523 
127 
55 
52 . 5 
48 . 25 
~5 
37 . 5 
30 
29 
15. 7 
16. 8 
11 
10 
7. 5 
5.1 
5 
~. 5 
2 
1. 5 
1 . • 25 
5o5 
Cont rolled by 
all Ivlitsui 
interest % 
55 
60 
50 
32 . 2 
35 
30. 3 
41 . 5 
38 . ~ 
36 . ~ 
~. 7 
48 . ~ 
38. 8 
~{ 
~1 
33. 3 
41+ . 2 
39 . 2 
35.1 
? 1 
29 . 7 
39. 2 
IV. The Lin-gi Management System of the Japanese Company 
1 •. The Lin-gi Nanagement System 
(1). Definition 
Lin is a Japanese word written '\'lhich 
means ' to report to the seniors' while Gi written can 
be interpreted 1 to consult' . 54 Thus, the Lin-gi system, 
in a simple literary explanation, is a system which re-
quires reports and consultations . The subordinates have 
no specified delegated authority and are required to seek 
the approval of the president to execute duties of some 
importance in the organization. To seek the approval of 
the president , the subordinates are required to make , first 
of all, a documentary report for each case separately and 
the form of this documentary report should meet the es-
tablished requirements of the general affairs department , 
and the contents of the report should first be approved by 
the direct supervisor of this documentary reporter. 55 This 
documentary report is called a Lin- gi document and the 
the affair is called a Lin-gi case . 56 Then this Lin-gi 
document should be circulated to all the related department s 
for consultation. All the section chiefs and the department 
heads to whom the document has been circulated should study 
the document carefully, especially on the points rel ated 
to the department and give their personal seals and comments 
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in the blank assigned as a mark of acknowledgement. After 
circulation to all the related depa rtments, this Lin-gi 
document would be forwarded to the general affairs depart-
ment and through this department head, the document would 
be submitted to the president for a formal approval . 
Then this approved document would be handed do\~ through 
a similar channel to originating department . With this 
approval of the president, the execution -of the duty begins . 
The system which requires this procedure to execute business 
activities in the organization is called the Lin- gi system. 
The core of the system is in the flow of the pro-
cedure rather than in t he approval or consultation. 57 
The flow of the procedures is based on the organizational 
structures imported f rom the western nations and so in 
appearance the Lin- gi system seems f amiliar to the people 
of forei gn organizations . What makes it totally Japanese 
is the traditional practice of the system, which derives 
its or igin from the two major principles of the Japanese 
family system . 58 These principles were adopted from the 
Conf ucian ideology of social orders . 
The first principle is the f eudalistic idea t hat 
the rel a tionship between ruler and sub ject is expressed 
in the two words, nanely authority and obedi snce . 59 In 
this ~ociety the subject is supposed not to be aware of 
himself as an independent individual who is capable of 
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judgment or making his own decisions . The subject is 
supposed to hmnble himself as a completely dependent sub-
ordinate whose only virtue is obedience . He neither judges 
nor has he his own will. He acts only when he is told to 
do so by his ruler . As he has no authority of any kind , 
so he is not held respons~ble for anything . A feudalistic 
society observes the law of natural heritage . The ruler is 
given authority by birth and is responsible to no one . 
His subordinates live under the protection of his conscience . 
No matter what he may do or decide his subordinates are 
always obliged to pledge their loyalty and to remain 
obedient to their ruler. 
This austere ruler- subject relationship is joined 
to the other principle of t he Japanese fanily system, the 
cooperative humanity of the clan society. The agricultural 
economy is the origin of the clan society in which each 
member is related either by liiood or by marriage . In this 
society , an atmosphere of amiable human emotions prevails , 
which blurs the austere fac e of authority. Here each indi-
vidual is supposed to suppress his own will and to follmv 
the will of all . Independent individuals are melted into 
the group and actions of individuals must be in accord with 
the objectives of the group . Here in this society, decisions 
are made by the group rather than by individuals . The 
reponsibility , therefore, belongs to the group rather 
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than to the individuals . Within this cooperative system 
juniors will respectfully keep their seniors inf ormed of 
intended actions . In return, the seniors will customarily 
protect the juniors in case of errors re sulting from the 
conduct of the juniors . By informing his seniors and 
respecting them, the ju_. iors are protected against possible 
mistakes in the future . This idea goes a step further 
than in~ orming and respecting one's colleagues . Through 
the seniors, the agents derive a feeling of security about 
their actions . This feeling of security. is . the source of 
the real attraction vlhich the Japanese feel for the 
Lin-gi system . 60 
The principles of the family system strongly 
dominate the conduct of people in society. The austere 
relation of authority and obedience, which is expressed 
in the relation of report and approval , controls the 
business activities of the J apanese. The humanly emo-
tional at mosphere is expressed in the system of consultation 
and helps harmonize the cooperation in the organization. 
The Lin - gi system is a formal administra tive 
procedure mainly adopted by the l arge business firms of 
Japan . 61 It really does not have any practical use to 
small individual concerns . The managers of small fi :rms , 
who are also the owners can efficiently manag e the business 
activities without a formal administrative procedure and 
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extra documentary work. The organization of fo~1al business 
concerns was not introduced until the foreign powers 
knocked at Japan ' s ports to demand f or trade in the second 
· part of the 19th century, even though there had been always 
small stores which were never formerly organized . With 
the opening of the ports , the foreign business firms began 
coming into the country and -starting business with the 
local merchants . The products, the size of' the foreign 
business firms , and their bargaining strength made the 
Japanese people aware of theneed for establishing industries 
and organizing lar~e business concerns so that they could 
equal the foreign powers . 62 
Around 1870, many new industrie-s were _established 
and many companies were organized .either by t he government, 
by the wealthy merchants , or by both. It was also at this 
time ' that Japan began employing many foreign specialists 
and sending talented youth to study in the west. A few 
companies not only survived competition but also grew 
to giant size, especially those companies \vhich with 
special protection from the govermnent became holding coril -
panies . 
Those youths who had been sent to study in the 
west returned to the· country upon the completion of their 
studies, and were either placed in the government or 
employed in these companies of Zaibatsu . It was to these 
I 
I 
I 
I 
companies and mainly.through these foreign educated youth 
that the we~tern business conception? were introduced.63 
Upon the proclamation of the five charters by 
1·~eiji Emperor in 1868, feudalism disappeared from the poli-
tical society of Japan . But it did not mean that feudalism 
died in Japanese society. On the contrary, feudalism took 
another shape and began to live in these mamoth organizations 
of the zaibatsu . The president of the parental company of 
a zaibatsu is like a fi.ef lord and the top executives of . 
the parental company are like the ministers of the fief 
lord . The department heads and the section chiefs are the 
samurai heads , and the clerks are sarnurais . The relation-
ship between the president and the subordinates are that 
of authority and obedience . Authority is highly concentrated 
on the top of the organization and the obedience and loyalty 
of the subordinates are highly valued . From the tradition 
.of the feudalistic society, the life long service is still 
practiced in the business organization. 64 
Due ·to the supply of labor from the farms, the · 
business organizations are strongly influenced by the 
patriarchy of the clan society. 65 A paternalistic atti-
tude of' the executives tmvard their subordinates prevails 
in the business · organizations . A good connection vTi th the 
company and the capability of the individual are always the 
two major factors for getting employment in the company. 
I 
•, 
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Once employed, the individual is almost guaranteed -df a 
life long job in the company. To reward the services of 
t~e employees; the companies not only pays the regular 
salaries and wages, but also takes care of the private 
lives of their employees and sometimes even sponsers their 
public activities . 
The giant companies of the zaibatsu brought in the 
business procedures of the western nations and yet to 
suit the traditions of the nation the Lin-gi . system \>laS 
adopted as a means of m~agement of the public institu-
tions as well as the business concerns . The policy formu-
lations, the project planning , decision making ," coordi-
nations, controlling of the business activities and many 
other functions of the management are carried out through 
the Lin-gi system. The Lin-gi system has long been practiced 
by most of the large companies of the zaibatsu 1vhich due 
to their economic strength doninate Japan's business and 
her industries . Thus, the Lin-gi system is the backbone 
of these l a rge firms f or their ad1;1inistration, and these 
large firms of the ~aibatsu, in turn, a re the baclcbone 
of Japan's economy. The management of the Japanese companies 
is often called' Lin- gi managenent •.66 
(2). Organization 
These large companies which adopt the 1in-gi 
system f or administrative procedure \>Tere organized lvith a 
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functional structure . As result , their management is 
Very functional . A typical si~plified organizational chart 
r:1ay look as follmv-s . 67 
Ope~ation 
Departnent 
President 
Director General 
t.------..:.Nanaging Director 
Executive Director 
I 
Comptroller's 
Departnent 
Pershnnel 
Department 
Genlral 
Affairs 
Department 
Branch offices 
I I 
' 
Sales 
Branch Factory A Factory B 
Office 
Nanage r Nanager Hanager 
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In theory , many Japanese firms have a departmental line 
organization as in the chart . These depa rtments in the 
he~d office should be staff menbers to the president, and 
the branch offices are the line subordinates to the presi-
dent . However , in practice , these department heads in the 
head offi ce resume a staff function to the president and 
meam·rhile take a line authority over the managers of the 
branch offices on the matter related to his department 
duties . These relationships are accomplished through the 
Lin- gi system. The head of t he personnel department in 
the head office would direct his section chief to draft an 
annual bonus plan . When the plan is made , it , .. wuld be made 
in a Lin- gi document and he vwuld check the plan and give 
his approval . Then this Lin-gi document of the annual 
bonus plan would be circulated to the departments of comp-
troller and operation. With the~r consulta tions , the do-
cument '\•Tould be forwarded to the general affai r s department 
and through the head of the gener:1l affairs department the 
docunent vToul d be submitted to the president , who might 
take up this case to the comr1ittee of the executive directors 
and have their opinions or might just gi~e his approval 
without consulting others . ere the head of ·the personnel 
department resumes the staff function to the president . 
With the decision of the top executive , a wage 
policy would be formulated and the staff member of the 
personnel department \•Tould be given the detail work . 
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Under this '\-Tage policy, the department of finance 1.-vould 
make a vrage budget . During the formulation of the wage 
policy these staff members, such as the head of the personnel 
department, comptroller, and other department heads, might 
be called in to the top executives for their suggestions 
or opinions . These staff heads would resume a line super-
visory authority only over the employees of their ovm de-
partments by directi?g and supervising their works . Generally, 
in the line and staff organization~ these staff heads do 
not take line authority over the branch offi ces, but give 
staff services when requested . 
But in the Japanese business organizations that 
adopt the Lin-gi system , the staff heads also have a line 
authority all over the organization on the mat ter directly 
concerned with their specific departments . The head of the 
personnel department , for example, rules practically all 
the affairs of personnel in the v.rhole organization, . The 
power to hire , fire , promote, transfer, pay wages and so 
on are all in his hands except that he needs the approval 
seal of the president for the procedure of the Lin- gi 
system . The fact is that the president very often gives 
perfunctory approval on the Lin-gi documents, which have 
been examined and consulted by all the related departments 
before they reach his hand . Mr . Sadataka Iba, vlho was the 
director general of the Sumitomo Zaibatsu in the period 
of 1898 to 1904, was very famous for giving his perfunctory 
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seals of approval . The master of the Sumitomo Zaibatsu 
is like 1 a symbolic emperor 1 \vho never participates him-
self in the business and so the real top administra tor 
of the Sumitono Zaibatsu is the director general . Nr . 
Iba gave his con~ents on the Blind Seal of Iba, when some 
of his associates r1ade fun of him. 
There are only two or three tines that the matter 
would be so consequential that the top executive 
would be required to give his seals at the risk 
of life . It would be more than too much if the 
matter of such importance occured more than five 
times during his presidency. For the rest of 
the affairs , notging matters but to give per-
functory seals . 6 
He also said : 
The document should not be made at all, if they 
could not ·be given perfunctory seals . The sub-
ordinates should not employed at the very 
beginning , if they could make only those docu-
ments '~ .. Thich could not be given perfunctory seals . 69 
Thus , the department heads of the head office are the real 
decision makers of the conpany as a result of the adoption 
of the Lin- gi system. 
Ivost of the large companies in Japan have branch 
offices and plants , which are located apart from the 
head office . The head office , which consists of the top 
executives and all the departments , make all the plans, 
and decisions for the branches and plants . Having adopted 
a highly centralized authority in the Lin- gi system , the 
branches and plants have hardly any authority delegated 
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and can hardly do anything without requesting approval 
from the head office . 70 In the organizational structure, 
the managers of the . branch offices and the plants are 
directly responsible to the president of the coflpany. Yet 
t_ e Lin- gi system require them to report through the de-
partment heads of the head office . Thus, the organizationa~ 
structure of the Japanese companies is a departmental line 
organization in v.Thich the staff members of the head office 
have a direct line authority over the related departments 
of the branch offices . 
(3). Common Procedures 
The Lin-gi system differs slightly from one 
company to another , for s ome companies may take a dif-
ferent name vThile soae others may use a little different 
channels in the processing the documents . However , the 
differences are not large or significant . 71 
Generally , a company has the Lin - gi regulations 
which specify all the cases that should be submitted for 
the approval of the president through the Lin-gi procedure 
before any treatment of such cases can be taken . In 1951 
Mr . Toyoaki Ono surveyed twenty fairly large companies 
and collected all the cases which were processed through 
the Lin- gi system. For the convenience of the study, he 
classified the cases into four general categories and 
eliminated all the sinilar cases . They are : 
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(I). The cases that the oresident should ulan . 
(i) . Cases that should be decided by the general 
meetings of the stockholders . 
(A).Particular examples 
i) . Consequential matters regarding the 
stockholders 1 gener al meetings .· 
ii) . Bills of the stockholders' meetings . 
iii) . Changes , revisions and abolitions of 
the articles established in the past . 
(B). Generalized cases 
Organization of the enterprise and its top 
management personnels . 
Initiator: K~etings of the executive directors. 
(2) . Cases that should be decided by the executive 
directors . 
(A) Particular exa;aples 
i) . Cases re garding the meeting of the 
executive directors . 
ii ). Changes of the regulations mad e by 
the meeting of the executive directors . 
iii) . Decisions for over-all budget 
(B) . Generalized cases 
i) . Decisions f or general policies . 
ii) . Cases regarding the general inspection. 
iii) . Maintenance of the organizati onal 
s~ructure . 
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Initiator: President 
(II) . The cases that the president should make hi s deci -
sions . 
(1) . Gene ral pol i cies ba sed on the basic pr inci ples 
decided by t he meeting of executive directors . 
(A) . Pa rt i cular examples 
i ). Decisions f or the company ' s busi ness 
policy. 
ii ). Deci sions f or t he major· opera tional 
policies . 
iii) . Formulations of the polici es f or the 
cases vlhich are under the responsi -
bi l ity of the departments and sections . 
iv) . For ulations of the busines s pl ans and 
t he administrative pol i cie s f Qr t he 
subsidiary compani es . 
(B). Generalized cases 
Decisions for the general administrative 
policies . (Ex. Business pol ici es and po-
licies for f or mulating budget . ) 
Initiator . Secretaria te of the executive 
directors . 
( 2). Ba sic plans and ma jor af f airs of the business 
of the company. 
(A) . Particula r examples 
i ). Fornulations of the basic business 
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plans such as production plans, sales, 
material purchasing , advertising, re-
cruiting , inspection, etc. 
ii ). Changes of the above mentioned basic plans. 
iii) . Formulations of the iwportant plans in 
regard to labor relations, welfare of 
employees, education, and training , and 
changes of these plans . 
iv) . Formulations and changes of ma jor research 
and experimental projects . 
v) . Decisions on the principles for shipping 
contracts and insurance contracts. 
(B) . Generalized ca ses 
i ) . Formulations of the important plans f or 
business opera tions(Ex. Production plans, 
field 1·10rk plans). 
Initiator: Chief of ·Manufacturing Depa r t ment 
ii) . Decisions of the major principles for 
the busin ess operations . (Ex . coverage 
standard f or damage insurance policy) 
Initiator: Chief of Gene ral Affairs Dept. 
iii) . Stock level of the raw materials. 
Initiator: Chie f of Supply DepartJ. ent 
(3). Cases of budgetary and accounting affai rs. 
(A) . Particular examples 
i) . Decisions and changes of the operational 
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budgets . 
ii). Decisions on defr ayment unprovided for 
in the budget. 
iii). Decisions on the major accounts and tech-
niques for preparing f inancial statments. 
(B) . Generalized cases 
Changes and decisions f or the over-all budgets 
and operational budgets . 
Initi ator : Comptroller 
(4). Gains and losses of the property and the financial 
matters . 
(A) . Particula r examples 
i) . Additions of ma jor fac ilities, pro-
perties, and expansions of plants, changes 
and demolitions and other dispositions .of 
properties . 
ii) . Ha jor cases of financial arrangements. 
iii) . The borrowing of the large amount of 
capital and becoming guar~~tor fo r other 
individuals or concerns . 
iv) . A substantial amount of investment and 
loans . 
(B) . Generalized cases 
i). Substantial changes of properties, fa-
cilities, and purchase or sale s of 
machines . 
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Initiator : Chief of Operation Department 
ii) . Long term financial arrangements and 
long term investments. 
Initiator: Comptroller 
(5) . Organization 
(A) . Particular examples 
i) . Ha jor changes in organizational structures . 
ii) . Changes of the company regulations. 
iii) . Names, locati ons, and affiliations of 
the branch offices and subsidiary com- · 
panies . 
iv) . The changes of the areas a s signed. 
(B) . Generalized cases 
i) . Creations of new divisions and abolish-
ment of the existing divisions. 
ii) . Changes of the company regulations. 
Initiators of i and ii: Chief of General 
Affairs Depart ment . 
iii) . Changes of the established systems . 
(Ex. Budget system, Pricing system , 
inspection system, and accounting 
system) 
Initiator: Comptroller 
(6) . Personnel Affairs 
(A) . Part icular examples 
i) . Establishment of the standard practices 
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of personnel affairs . 
ii) . Personnel matters regarding high ranking 
officials , including depar tment heads, 
1 anagers of the brach offices . 
iii) . Establishment of the number of the re- · 
gular work forc e. 
iv) . Labor agree ent and labor contract 
v) . Decisions of working conditions . 
- vi) . Decision s on wage payment system and 
ar.1ount of bonus . 
(B) . Generalized cases 
i) . The personnel ca ses of the department 
heads and managers of the branch offices . 
ii) . Establishment of the regula r work ~· orce. 
iii) . Forrnul at ion of labor agree ent. 
Init i ator: Chief of Personnel Department 
(7 ). Operation 
(A) . Particular examples 
i) . Beginni ng and termina tion of operations 
(B) . Generalized cases 
Beginning and end of operations. 
Initiator: Chief of ! anu:::.' actur ing Dept . 
(8) . l'1 aj or external operations 
( ) . Particular exa~ples 
i) . Naj.or sales contract and supply contract . 
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ii) . Appointments of' authorized vrholesal ers, 
dealers, and agents . 
iii) . Appointrr.ents of the regular suppliers . 
i v) . Appointment of the Company' s banks . 
v ). I mportant law suits . 
vi) . The change s of the seals of the company. 
vii) . I nportant documents dealing 1vi th the 
problems outside the company. 
viii) . Publication of the i mp ortant statistic 
data . 
ix ). Hired surveys and investigations . 
x) . Distribution of important map s and 
·photographs . 
(B). Generalized cases 
i ). Conclusions of various kinds of contracts 
f or the company . 
i i). Appointments of dealers . 
Initiator: Chief of Sales Department 
iii ). Appointments of suppliers 
Initiator: Chief of Supply Department 
iv) . Appointment of b~1ks 
Initiator : Comptroller 
v ). Law suits 
vi ). Changes of the company ' s seals 
Initia tor of v and vi: Chief of General 
affairs Depart ment 
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vii) . External affairs of i mportance 
viii). Transference and publication of the 
important statistical data 
Initi ators of vii and viii: Chief of the 
conce rned departments. 
(9). Control 
(A). Particular examples 
(B). Generalized cases 
i) . Formulation of the plans for internal 
inspection. 
ii) . Appointment of the internal inspectors. 
iii) . Operation of the unexpected inspections. 
Initiator : Secretary general of the executive 
directors . 
(III). The cases that should have the auproval of the 
president . 
(1). Gains and losees of the properties . 
(A). Particular exa. ples 
i) . Gain and l oss of a piece of property 
priced more than a certain amount of 
money. 
ii) . Purcha se a piece of real estate priced 
more than X X. dollars . 
iii) . Disposition of any peoperty that is 
• 
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priced at X X dollars and more. 
iv) . Leasing and lending of the premises . 
v) . Pre-planned repairs, modifications, and 
new installation of machines. 
vi) . Gains, los ses , and other kinds of changes 
in the rights and intangible properties . 
(B). Generalized cases 
i) . The gain and loss of the property of 
which each piece is valued more than 
X X dollars . 
ii) . Leasing and lending of the properties . 
Initiators of i and ii: Chiefs of Construc-
tion and Haintenance , Department, Supply 
Depart ment , and General Affairs Depa rtment . 
iii) . Gains and losses of the intangible pro-
perties, such as patents, trade ma rks, 
mining rights etc . 
Initiator: Chief of General Affairs Dept. 
(2) Purchases of the supplies and materials f or the 
property repair work . ( repair works, purchases 
of the materials f or the works, purchases of 
supplies .) 
(A). Particular examples 
i ). Any repair vrork ,,,hich exceeds X X 
dollars 
ii). purchases of materials and tools exceeding 
65 
X X dollars and their repairs . 
iii) . Any case of the material transporta tion 
cost which exceeds X X dollars. 
iv). Purchases of the welfare supplies which 
exceed X X dollars . 
v) . Purchases of fuels , powers, and other 
specified supplies . 
(B). Generalized cases 
i) . Repairs of the facilities and premises 
and supplement of the supplies and ma-
terials, which exceed X X dollars . 
Initiators: Chiefs of Construction and 
J::aintenance Depa rtment, Supply De-
pa rtment, and General Affai rs Dept . 
ii) . Purcha ses of supplies and materials ex-
ceeding X X dollars . 
Initiator: Chief of Supply Depart ment 
iii) . Purchases of the welfare goods exceeding 
X X dolla rs . 
Initiator: Chief of Personnel Department 
(3) Entries and other bookkeeping arrangements of the 
properties . 
(A). Particular e±~aples 
i) . Transfer of registered equipment and 
any equipment valued more than X X 
dollars . 
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ii) . Entries of fixed properties and their 
appraisal values and depreciations. 
(B). Generali zed cases 
Entries, depreciation, transfers , and ap-
praisals of fixed properties. 
Initiator: Comptroller . 
(4). Financial Hatters 
(A). Particular examples 
i) . Writing off any bad debts exceeding 
X X dollars . 
ii) . Writing off obsolete facilities. 
i ii) . Lending and borrowing oney exceeding 
X X dollars and important guarantees. 
iv) . Guarantees, issue of notes, lending and 
borrowing of money that are beyond the 
regular business operations . 
(B). Generalized cases 
i). Lending and borrowing of money and 
guarantee of liabilities exceeding the 
amount of X X dollars. 
ii ). Dispositions of any bad debt exceeding 
X X dollars . 
Initiator: Comptroller 
(5). Disbursement of operational expenditures . 
(A). Parti cular examples 
i) . Donation and pa~nt of any annual 
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membership fees exceeding X X dollars . 
ii ). Any reward and compensation that exceed 
X X dollars . 
(B) . Generalized cases 
i ). Any ca se of donation or payment f or an-
nual membership fees exceeding X X dol-
lars . 
ii ). Any ca se of rev~ards and compensations 
-vrhich exceed X X dollars. 
Initiator: Chief of General Affairs Dept . 
(6 ). Organi zation 
(A) . Particular examples 
Creation and abolition of sections, sub-
sections and othe r organizational changes. 
(B) . Generali zed cases 
Creation and abolition of sections and 
other organizational changes within de-
partments . 
Initiator: Chief of General Affai rs Dept . 
(7 ). Personnel 
(A) . Particular exampl es 
i) . Personnel matters of officers who are 
acting section chiefs or higher posi-
tions . 
ii) . Awards and punishments for any officer 
who is acting section chief or higher 
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positions, and the decisions of their 
pensions . 
iii) . Any ca se of group awards exceeding X X 
dollars. 
(B) .Generalized cases 
Personnel affairs of officers who occupy 
certain positions. 
Initiator: Chief of Personnel Department 
(8) Operation 
( ). Particular examples 
i ). Termination of i mp ortant operations. 
ii) . Changes of ma jor working methods . 
(B). Generalized cases 
Te rmination of i mportant operations and 
changes of maj or working methods. 
Initiator: Chief of Manufacturing Dept. 
(9). Negotiat i ons and external rel ations . 
(A). Particula r examples 
i). I mportant contracts. 
ii). I mportant negotiations . 
(B). Generalized cases 
I mp ortant contracts and negotiations. 
Initiator: Chiefs of the concerned Depts. 
<10). Others 
(A). Particula r examples 
i) . I mportant conferences and affairs . 
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ii) . Other important things and exceptional 
matters . 
iii) . Expenses which exceed X X dollars of the 
budgetary allowance. 
iv) . Some important chang es of vlhat have al -
ready been decided by the president . 
(B). Generalized cases 
i) . Important conferences and i nportant 
affairs . 
ii ). Some il:1portant affairs a s signed by the 
president . 
Initiator : Chiefs of the concerned Depts . 
(IV). Cases for which the president should delegate authority. 
(1) . Cases that should be decided by the departme~t 
heads . 
(A) . Parti cular examples 
i) . The fo r mul ations of rules and changes 
of the computation items. 
ii) . The additions and changes of ledgers 
and other books f or bookkeeping 
purposes . 
(B). Generalized ca ses. 
------ ----------- -~ 
Init iators : Chiefs of concerned 
Departments !72 
.. 
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These cases are clearly specified in the Lin- gi re-
gulations in sone companies but in others these cases are 
known from the past pr act i ces . During the execution of the 
business activities, the initi ators are required to direct 
their subordinates to draft the Lin-gi docum.ents vrhen they 
co~e across any of these cases . After the draft of the Lin-
gi document is nade, it '\vill be presented to the head of the 
initiating departnent for an initia ting approval . Some times 
the case may be initiated by a clerk or section chief but it 
must seek the , initial approval of the i mmediate supervi sor 
who is the head of the department directly concerned . 
Usually, the names appearing in the Lin-gi documents as 
drafters are section chiefs and 'initiators a re t he departnent 
heads, plant nanagers, or nanagers of the branch offices . 
The approved documents will be processed and presented for 
consultations and the f i nal approval of the president . The 
results of the survey conducted by Mr . Ono show that there 
are four patterns in general . 
Pattern A 
The Lin- gi document is drafted either with the order 
of a particular head or as a part of duties of usual routine 
work by the section chiefs . Thus, the section chief is the 
drafter . The draft of the Lin- gi document is submitted to 
the direc t department head fo r an initiating approval . 
Thus, the depart ment head is the initiat6r of t his 
'· 
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Lin-gi case. With this initiating approval of the depart -
ment head , this Lin-gi document is sent to the general affairs 
depar.tmeht of the head J:>.t::' • O.L .Ll Ce . Here the Lin-gi document is 
checked , filed, and proces sed . Circulation order is arranged 
and other remarks ma y be given. In this pattern , the pro-
ces sings of Lin-gi document s is central ized in the general 
affai rs department and the head of the general affairs de-
partment is the presenter of the Lin-gi documents . With the 
seal of the head of the general affairs department, the 
Lin- gi docu ent is circulated for the pu rpose of consultation 
to t he heads of the concerned departments chosen by the 
general affairs department . Thus, the heads of the concerned 
departments are the consultees . In many cases, aft er circu-
l atory consultation by the heads of the concerned departments , 
the Lin-gi document is al so presented to some particular 
~anaging executive directors for opinions . Therefore, these 
managing executive directors are regarded as senior consultees . 
Finally, the Lin-gi document is submitted to the president 
for final approval . After approval by the president , the 
authorized Lin- gi document is sent directly dovm to the 
general affairs department which in turn notifies the ini-
tiator and consultees of the approval . With the notification 
of the approval, the initiating depa rtment head gives orders 
to the plant managers or the superintendent of the field 
work to start the project . 
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Pattern B 
In this pattern, the plant managers or the superin-
tendents of the field works are the initiators of the Lin-gi 
documents . The plant managers forvrard the document directly 
to the head of the department in the head office, who is 
directly in charge of the case of the Lin-gi document . The 
Lin-gi doc~ent is processed in this department and the head 
of this department assumes the function of the direct super-
visor of the case and the presenter of the Lin-gi document . 
There is no independent presenter of the Lin-gi docuoents 
as is in Pat tern A, in vrhich the processing of the Lin-gi 
documents is centralized in the general affairs department . 
The presenter circulates the Lin-gi document to the consultees 
for consultations . After the consultations, the document 
· goes up to the president for the final approval. And after 
the approval from the pre sident , the Lin-gi document is re-
tu.rned to the presenter or the head of the department in 
charge of the ca se, v-rho is to notify the initiator and the 
concerned departments . 
Pattern C 
This pa ttern is slightly different from Pattern B. 
In this pattern, the plant oanagers are still the initiators 
of the Lin-gi docunents and their subordinates are the drafters 
of the Lin-gi cases. As in Pat tern B, the Lin- gi docunents 
are directly submitted t o t e heads of the departments of 
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the. head. office. The next step in Pattern C is sl ightly dif-
fe r ent from Pattern B. The head of the general affairs de-
partment is st i ll the presenter of the Lin-gi documents and 
therefore, the head of the depart1 ent of the head off ice 
.in c1ar ge of the particular Lin-gi case is required to for-
\•Tard the Lin- gi document to the general affairs department 
in which the processing of the Lin-gi documents is cen-
tralized . The rest of the procedure is si ·ila r to that of 
Pattern B except that the gene·r al affairs department still 
assumes the function of notifi cation to the initiator and the 
concerned departments after the approval is given by the 
president . 
Pattern D 
In this pattern, the managers of the branch of~'ices 
and plants are not delegated with author ity to be ini tiators 
of the Lin- gi docunents . They can make drafts out of the 
cases \vhich they think require the approval of the senior 
off icers before ro1y action can be ta~en. With this draft, 
they ~ake an inquiry r eport to the head of the department 
of the head . office in charge of the particular ca se, who 
decides whether to take up it as a Lin-gi case and initiate 
the case or j ust r ejec t the case flatly . Here the head of 
the department of the head office is the initiator with the 
authority of initiating approval and the authority of refusal . 
If the initiator ha s taken up t he case, he makes the Lin-gi 
docw~ent and f orward it to the department of the general 
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affairs through which it is circulated to consu~tees and sub-
mitted to the office of the president. After approval it is 
returned to the head of the initiating department via the 
general affairs department . 73 
(4). Char acter istics . 
The large Japane se concerns adopted the 
Lin- gi system as a means of direct control to take the place 
of a well developed system of mode rn budget control or a 
system of job specification that cl early defines the autho-
rity and responsibil ity of each job . 74 Without a well-
developed system of budget control, i t is necessary for the 
management to l ay down a set of regulations to control t heir 
subordinates and check each of their business acitivities . 
The Lin- gi system is that checking sys t em, and al so a highly 
centralized autocratic method of direct control . The fact 
that the approval of the president is required vrhen each 
case of repai r work exceeds X X dollars ar when a bad debt 
that exceeds X X dolla rs is written off or Bhen t he purchase 
of a machine exceeds X X dollars clea rly illustrates the 
autoc r a tic control on each separate Lin-gi ca se. On the other 
hand , the practice of the Lin- gi system as a means of control 
is more strict there is the less development of the system 
of budget control and le ss practice of delegation of authority 
and responsibility. 75 
Generally, there a re no job specifications f or eQch 
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job held, though there are specifically assigned duties for 
each depa rtment and every unit of the organizat ion.76 
Duties of each departnent and each section are clearly spelled 
out in mo st of the large concerns . The authority and responsi-
bility of each job have never been clearly defined except that 
a few regulations have expressed the duties of the executives 
in a very general terms such as: 11 the pre sident should control 
the company •••• " and 11 the directors of the departments should 
assist the president , and direct and supervise the works of 
the subordinates •••• etc . "77 All these expressions are in 
such general terms that it is difficult to define the authority 
and responsiblity of each job . Thus, the Lin-gi system acts 
to give the limits of the authority and responsibility between 
the job holders and the president . The Lin-gi regulations 
state that without the approvals of the president , f or 
instance, the follovring cases can not be treated, or that it 
should have the approval of the president when the repair 
work exceeds X X dollars . The delineation of authority is 
not exact . Here X X dollars and the need of the approval of 
the pres i dent set the c·eiling limit of the authority of the 
Lin-gi initiator, who is usually the head of the depa rtment , 
and the bottom limit of the authority of the president . 
According to the Lin-gi regulations , each case is to 
be treated separately and individually. Originally, the 
Lin-gi system wa s devised before the budget system or any 
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other system of management planning came into existance . 78 
Through the Lin- gi system, the managetlent examines each ca se 
carefully and decides to give approval or rejection. In 
addition to retaining the cont rol in the top execut i ve of 
the company , the Lin-gi system wa s adopted to utilize the 
talents and khowledge of the subordinat es . However, as the 
company grows large~ and relations wi thin the organization 
get more compli cated , the Lin-gi system fails of its purpose . 
The positive function of the system to facilit ate and stimulate 
the business operations degene r ates into the negative aspect 
of merely checking t he operations of the business activities 
of the company. Each case of expansion or adding facilities, 
for instance, is i mp or t ant and good by itself , but since it 
is difficult to f oretell the total cost by accumulating tne 
cases of this nature in a year , the management tend s not to 
give approval on such ca se s unle'ss the cases are very ne..,. .. 
c essary. Here the syst em is used for checking rather than 
f or any posi tive purpose . 
The Lin- gi system w~ s adopted to help manage l a rge 
concerns . Through the system , a highly centralized author i ty 
is ret ained in the top executive who is usually also the 
owner or the largest shareholder of the company . With t his 
centralized authority in hand , this top executive can c·ontrol 
t e business activities of the company at any moment . The 
Lin- gi system , therefore, is regarded as the best instrument 
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for the 'one-man-control' type of management . 79 Gradually, 
the system ha s been regarded as a mere formality and the 
joint repsonsibi l ity of the consultees and the initiator 
has become obscured . For every body's responsibi l ity becomes 
no body's responsibility . Thinking that the f inal decision 
rests with the pre sident, the examiners of the Lin-gi ca ses 
in the middle level of ten give their seals of consultations 
on the Lin-gi documents for me re f orm's sake. 80 On the part 
of the president, the lined- up seals of the consul ted depart-
ment he ads and the initiator of the Lin-gi docum ent of ten 
make the pre sident believe that the Lin-gi document pre sented 
h a s been carefully de signed and ex~~ined . With this belief 
in mi nd, the pres i dent, bu sy with many affa i rs, gives his 
seals care l ess l y . The top executive should ex.-:uJine each case 
carefully and clear up all doubts vli th his subordi nates before 
.he gives final approval . Owing to the underdevelopment of 
other systems of internal control and beglect of delegating 
au thori ty and res~onsibility to the subordina tes, the nre-
s i d ent of a company vrhere the authority is hi gh l y central ized 
of ten ind s himsel f too busy with this document a ry work and 
other business act i vities of the compa ny to go ove r the 
documents thoroughl y . As a r e sult, he a oes not have enough 
time to think ahe ad, to make l ong range pl ans, and to estab-
lish general bu siness pol icies f or the company. Generally, he 
relies on his subordinates to do all sor ts of policy maki ng 
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long i range planning , by means of the Lin-gi system. His 
limited energy enables him to give barely 1 blind seals' , 
to preside over numerous conferences, and visit plants and 
brru1ch offices when his company has grown fairly large. 
t this point , the president relinquishes his initiative of 
the business activities to the management on the middle l evel. 
The practice of the Lin-gi system, as a result, transfers 
the administration of a concern to the middle management 
and this is the typical characteristic of Japane se f irms.Bl 
2. Elements that support the system. 
(1). Social hierarchy 
Individualism is carefully cherished and strongly 
expressed in the society of the western world . Here in this 
hemisphere , social equality ha s long been practiced; indi-
vidual liberty , enjoyed; ru1d personal expression, valued. 
But the people in the Eastern hemisphere have long been 
orienta ted to the Confucian ideology of the social orders. 
The feudalistic rulers of J apan i nnorted this ideology from 
the continent and en~orced the practice of its ideas on the 
Japanese society. The occupational caste system was estab-
lished in the Japanese society and the ideals of the authority 
and obedience vrere instituted to maintain the social orders. 
Agricultural economy caused the Japanese to form a clan 
society which gave rise to the system of patriarchy. To 
maintain the social orders, obedience and loyalty were 
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enforced, and humbleness was praised. Individualism, wrrich 
tends to cause dissensions and, in turn, social disorder, 
was despise and suppressed. Each person was taught to be-
have properly in the l a rge family as well as in the larger 
family society. Thus, the minds of the Japanese people 
have long been orientated to the practice of the social 
hierarchy, although the feudalistic rule ended when the 
imperialistic government took over the administration. 
The Lin-gi system, in vrhich the authority is highly cen-
tralized and which requires the reports of the subordinates 
to execute the business activities, is not strange to the 
people of Japan. The system of joint responsibility in the 
consul tations of the Lin-gi management is also very fami-
liar \vith the minds of . the Japanese people , vrho have been 
ori entated to live in accord vri th the needs and aims of a 
large group . 
(2). Direct control 
The management of the Japanese companies is 
highly centralized . To explain the organization of a 
Japanese company in an over- simplified way, many large 
companies consist of two parts , the head office and the 
branch offi ces and plants . The head office is, in turn, 
made up of top management and all the departments . It is 
in this head office that decides all the major affairs of the 
business . In modern decentralized management , the authority 
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to deci~e the techniques m1d ways of discharging business 
activJ ties should be delegated to the managers of the branch 
offices or plants. However, in the central ized management, 
there is hardly any authority delegated to subordinates. 
Even those items which might be well delegated to the branch 
offices or plants are still decided in the head office. In 
the plants and branch offi ces of the J apane se companies, 
almos t nothing can be done without seeking the approval of 
th~ head offic e . To control such a highly centrali zed 
n1anagement, the Lin~gi system becomes necessa ry . The Lin- gi 
system enables the autocratic management to control directly 
all the departments and branch offices and judge each ma jor 
case separately. 82 
(3) . Inspection and approval 
The inspection system is the other side of the 
coin of the Lin- gi system. The Lin-gi system i-vill not be 
effective if there is no inspection system to back it up . 
After the approval is given , and the work is carried out, 
it is important to check and inspect whether the cases are 
discharged as they are designed and approved . The approved 
documents are always referred to in the inspection. · 
Gerterally, an independent inspection section is 
established in the organization. According to the need of 
the company, the numbe r · of · the inspecting officers is 
decided . These inspecting officers are to visit periodically 
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the plants, branch offices, and even departments of the head 
office to inspect whether the works are discharged in accor-
dance with the approval . After completion of a periodical 
inspection they are to make the reports about their findings 
in the inspection and suboit them to the pres i dent . This 
inspection system helps the president keep the centralized 
control . 
(4). Control of the seals of the comDany 
An officially registered seal of a person or an 
institution is a lawful representation of the pe rson or the 
institution. In Japan, the seal has an importance similar 
to a person's signature in this country. Almost every 
company has a set of strict regulations for handling the 
seals of the company. The monetary transactions, contracts, 
agreements, r egistration with the government for all kinds of 
activities and other legal actions of the company are all 
carried out through the procedure of giving the registered 
seals of the company. Not only the important negotiations, 
but all these activities such as the registeration of the 
immovable property with the government and even vehicles, 
that require the seals of the company and of the president 
should wait for the decision of the president. All the 
Lin-gi documents r equire the approval of the president and 
the app~oval of the president is accompanied with the pro-
cedure of having the seals of the company and of the president. 
Thus , the control of seals is a support to the practice of the 
Lin- gi system. 
(5) . Committee 
The Lin-gi system is designed so that the cen-
t r alized management can have direct control all over the 
company. The Lin-gi system treats each case separately. 
Because of this method of treating each case separately, 
there are no established general standards or clearly spe-
cified policies ~vhich may be taken as the . basis of discharging 
duties . In order to prevent each department from having dif-
ferent standard for discharging the duties of the same nature, 
a committee is necessary. Mq.ny kinds of committees are estab-
lished by different companies for this coordinating purpose . 
Meetings are called when the need for coordination occurs 
among departments . Through the Lin-gi system, the departments 
of the he ad office play the role of the specialized staff 
while this committee acts as the general staff to coordinate 
the depa rtments . This committee also ~eets periodically to 
discuss the probl ems arising from performance of the duties 
interrelated to the department s and help eliminate overlapping 
authority. With the help of this committee, the Lin-gi systen1 
c an function smoothly . 83 
3. Strong points of the Lin- gi system. 
(1) . Firm control 
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Since the Lin-gi sys t en is designed for a highly 
centralized management , the system certainly provides a firm 
control over the business activities of~e company by the 
top executive . Through the Lin- gi system, the president is 
supposedly always informed about the major affai rs of the 
company, for the Lin-gi system is regarded as two way com-
munication. The way-up carries information through the 
rela ted departments to the president while the way-down is 
the channel of orders . With the combination of the Lin-gi 
system and the inspection system, the orders of the president 
are carried through, and the pre sident ha s the whole organi-
zation under his direct control . With this firm control in 
hand, the president can fully express his leadership if he 
is an exceptionally capable managelt', though the system tends 
to cause underdevelopment of the staff members . 
( 2) . l-.{iddle management 
In theory, the Lin- gi system provides the top ex-
ecutive with a highly centralized authority for administra-
tion of the company. However , in practice, the system causes 
the top executive to lose the initiative of the management to 
the middle management vlhich initiates, consul tes, and discharges 
the Lin-gi cases . If the top executive is lucky enough to have 
a very capable team of middle management he can totally depend 
upon the middle management to carry out the functions of the 
management of the company . s a matter of f act, there are 
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many cases where the re al management of many Japanese business 
organizations is t heir middle management rather than their 
top management . With an unsurpassabl e financial streng th, 
and a monopolistic protection from the government, the l a rge 
companies have found that the Lin- gi system is good enough 
to discharge the operative managerjj;al functions . Without 
much risk the top executive r etains his authori ty of control 
and rel i es almost total ly upon the capabi l ity of the middle 
management . 84 
4 . Weakness of the Lin-gi system 
(1) . Underdevelopment of staff 
The highly centralized n1anagement of the J apanese 
cm1panies, which is based on a rather functional organization 
structure and sup ported by the Lin-gi system, has been quite 
eff icien t for discharging the operative f unctions . Bef ore 
the end of World Wa r II, the major functions of the mana ge-
ment of t hose large c oncerns -v;ere the operative function s, 
for the se l arge concerns were supported by great financial 
strength and protected 1.1i th a kind of monopol istic privilege 
from the government . There 1.vere ha r dly any mar keting prob-
lems --or any con sequenti al competition f or tlj.ose lar ge com-
panies . They were mainly bu sy with the colonial trade and 
colonial industries • • The acquisition of Formosa, Korea, 
l·1anchukuo , Kuriles , and a large part of China made t hem 
b.rea thless in exploitation and cau sed t hem to be busy in 
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controlling and coordinat·ing the· branch offices and subsi€1-
iary "companies that they set up in these acquired colonies . 
The backlogs of these large concerns -v;ere mainly government 
contracts and military assignments. The first Sino-Japanese 
War, The Russo-Japanese War, the First World War, the 
Nanchurian Incident, and the Second Sino-Japanese vlar all 
brought handsome spoils of territory and prosperity. The 
Japanese companies boomed with the prosperity of their na-
tion. Yet the fanatic venture of World War II gave Japan 
a fatal blow. She lost the colonies, her land was bombed 
and her industries almost completely destroyed . United 
States a i d and the Korean conflict and their know-how have 
helped reestablish their industries and enter their companies 
in the competitive vJOrld market . These large companies have 
no longer the unsurpassable financial backing , for the Zaibatsu 
were dissolved, nor do they have the monopolistic privileges 
of the gover~ent . In order to be competitive, they must 
solve their marketing problems , have compeitive products , 
operate efficiently and arrage their own financial funds . 
Control is no longer the only important function of manage-
ment . Long-range planning , gener al policy making, and 
raising f'u.nds have become the more i mportant functions for 
management Q In order to take up these functions of planning 
and policy making , it becomes necessary to strengthen the 
organization of top management with more assistance from 
staff members . In the management of the Lin-gi system, 
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there is no clear cut distinction between the f unctions of 
the top executive and the departments of head office , except 
for the fact that the top executive has the authority and the 
departments do the i·rork . Under such a system, the depa rt-
ments tend to be involved -vrith short range operative adminis-
t.ration . There is seldom any long range planning . or policies 
initiation by the departments , which are kept busy with the 
administration of daily duties . Under this system , the 
general staff gives assistance and suggestions to the top 
management in maki ng the long range plans and general business 
policies . There is also a lack of specialized service staffs 
in the brancn offices ~~d the ple~ts . Under the Lin-gi system, 
the departments of the head office are a ldnd of line authority 
rather than service staff . The depart.ents of the head office 
give directions and orders to the branch offices and plants, 
but not much in the line of service . 
(2). Vagueness of responsibilty 
Under the Lin- gi system , the authority is highly 
centralized a t the top and the departments are rather for 
functional purposes . The functi ons of the departments are 
clearly spelled out and \•TOrks are distributed to all the 
department s according to their fUnctions . However , there are 
no job de scriptions or specifications for all the jobs ivi thin 
the departments . Generally , the dep.artment of general affairs 
distributes the vrork to each ci epartr.1ent according to their 
functions, then the department he ~ds or the section chiefs 
assign the distributed works to their subordinates at vdll . 
Usually , the works are discnarged by the joint efforts of the 
group either vri thin the department or "l'Ti thin the section. 
Responsibility and authority are never specifically distri-
buted to each member of the company. Each job holder does 
only vlhat he is told to do in the daily activities of the 
company, and is seldom aware of any kind of responsibility, 
for responsibility can not be imposed ,,,i thout a proper au-
thority delegated . The subordinates are told to draft the 
Lin-gi c ~se s and yet the Lin-gi cases have to be approved by 
the department heads . fter the approval of the initiator, 
the Lin-gi documents are circulated for the consultation and 
have the consultees' approval . Finally, the Lin-gi documents 
are submitted to the president for the authorized approval . 
In theory, it is a joint responsibi l ity, but in practice, it 
becomes nobody' s responsibility. Even vrhen something goes 
wrong, no particular person can be penalized without punishing 
all other members whose seals appear on the Lin-gi documents . 
Therefore, this joint responsibility becomes nobody's respon-
sibility in reality. 85 
(3). Slowne~~ of action 
Due to the highly centralized management and the 
lack of a sys~em of delegated authority and responsibility, 
the subordinates are required to seek the approval of the 
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top executive through the channel of the Lin- gi procedure . 
Tgis is a long and time consuming trip for the documents . 
There are many things that could be decided at the level of 
branch offices and plants, if more authority and r esponsibility 
were delegated to the branch offices and plants . Repai r 
work or the purchase of suppl i es , for instance, could be 
delegated to the managers of the plants, if it falls vli thin 
the budgetary allowance . Without ' the delegation of authority 
and responsibility to subordinates , the top executive oost 
probably finds himself always busy '\·lith this minor documentary 
work . 
As the . company grows, the scope of operation expands, 
and the top executive has to depend more on the system to 
control the activities of the company. The system then is 
used for negative purpose to check the administrative works 
instead of facilit ating the work. The long tedious pro-
cedure and the negative use of the system all tend to delay 
action rather than expedite it . 
V . Improvement and Hodifications . 
1 . The Changes of the social conditions of J~pan . 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
'l.vestern nations began appearing much more frequently in the 
south east and far east Asia than in the pa st centtries. 
Their objective was to exploit these places by colonialism. 
India fell into the hands of England . Indochina and Burma 
came under French influence. Spain took over the Philippines 
and the Netherlands was interested in Java . In addition, 
these vlestern nations vrere all competing China proper, which 
is a huge continent and very desirable prey. Since it was a 
small island country , Japan was lucky enough to be not too 
much desired by the western pm.re rs , though some of them 
visited the islands . 
Aware of the danger from the western powers, the new 
government of Japan was determined to build up strong mi-
litary forces and industrial strength . She devoted all her 
efforts to these purposes . By the turn of the century, Ja~an 
was already one of the strongest pmvers of the \vorld . She 
defeated China in the f irst Si~Japanese War in 1895 and 
defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese \'la r in 1905. She 
also joined the first world war and fought Ger any. 11 
these wars brought her very handsm e spoils. She gained 
Formosa, Korea , Kurile islands , _Chingtao, and the Liaotung 
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Penisula . Japan also drove Russia out of Manchuria , which 
has been a part of ·Chinese territory but under the Rus sian 
influence, and established a puppet gover~ment called 
:Hanchukuo under Japanese control . Her economy boomed as she 
gained such large t e rritories and made them her colonies . 
In these newly added colonies , the l a rge zaibatsu concerns 
began to establish factories , branch offices, and subsidiary 
companie s . With all their efforts and production capacity, 
these zaibatsu companies could only barely provide the demand 
of the huge markets . In order to exploit and cul tivate these 
colonies and the sphere of interest in China , the Japanese 
government helped these compa. nies by enacting special laws 
and providing financial loans . A brief introduction of the 
development of Japan ' s machinery industry given in Industrial 
Japan , 1961 can very well ill ustrate the se points . 
It was about 90 years ag o, that Japan was 
transformed into a unifi ed modern stat P. . The 
ne\<r government was quick t o perceive that in 
order to build up a mod e rn state both in name 
and in substance the strengthening o ~· military 
powers and the pr01:10tion of industries , backed 
by a powerful national authority, were pri~e 
requi sites . Its first move was to confiscate 
all the armament factories hithe~to operated 
by the TokUgawa shogunate and by the regional 
vassal provinces . At the same time i·i.. took 
steps to promote the development of a nachinery 
industry by importing machines and equipment 
from abroad , and hj_ring the service of the fo reign 
engineers . Subsequently these sta te operated 
factories and plants were turned over to 
private interests . heanwhile, as the nation's 
economy made progress, new private machinery 
plants ·sprang up in rapid succession . 
9~ 
Actually , J apan's machinery industry made a 
very belated st .: ..rt- roughly one century behind 
Great Britain, the leading industrially advanced 
country of the time . This country managed to e-
merge very quickly from the inchoate st age to 
attain maturity, however , as a result of three 
succes sively victorious war s-- the Sino-Japanese 
War (1894- 1895), the Russo- Japanese War (1904-
1905), ru~d World War I (1914- 1918) , all of which 
naturally brought prosperity to Japan . 
About the ye a r 1890 , there were less than 
300 factories engaged in making machinery and 
tools, ships , and vehicles, but by 1920 the fig-
ure had increased to 3 , 500 . The output value 
\vas less than ¥ 500,000 in 1880, but the figure 
rose to ¥ · 7 , 44o~QOO in 1900, to¥ 100 million in 
1910, and to ¥ ~88 million in 1920 . There was 
a slow-do\vn in the 20 1 s . But from 1935 to 194o, 
when Japan's national aDd military resources 
were mobilized to the full for making inroads 
into the Asian continent and for the prosecution 
of the \>Ta r in Hanchuria and P&cifi c War, the 
i ndustry developed spectacularly. During the 
period extending things , f or subsidies in 
various from 1936 to 1940 , various res were 
enacted such as the liotor Car Hanufacturing 
Enterprise Lav.T, Airplane and Nachine Tool 
Manufacturing Enterprise La-vr, and the Key 
Hachinery Hanufacturing Enterprise LavT. 
These provided among other things, f or sub-
s idies in various forms and corporation tax 
exe-mT)·f;:i.ons . The rmtuut value in 1930 was 
~ 64-6 million and in 1935 it "\vas -¥ ' 1;381 . 
million. In other vrords , the figure had 
dop:bled in· the cource of only .five years • . 
T~e industry register~d an output Value 
of ¥ 2,370 million in 1937. In 1942., soon 
after the Pacif ic War broke out, the output 
level rose presipitately to¥ 9,200 million. 86 
Although the _production figu res had increased sharply, the 
export figures remained almost· the same and 80% of the nation's 
export went to the part of China under the Japanese control . 
1936 
37 
38 
?r6 
41 
42 
43 
Source: 
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TABLE 2 
JAPAN'S EXPORT TO CHINA IN COFPA~7SON 
WITH TrlE NATION'S TOTAL ZXPORT 
Iron and Steel Railway y ehicl es 
Products and Part s 
(milli on of yen) ( million of yen) 
To To 
Total China Total China 
0 0 20 . 7 19 . 8 
0 0 36 . 1 22 . 1 
0 0 51 . 2 31 . 9 
0 0 61 . 7 61.4 
108 80 84. 2 8~ . 2 
89 . 7 74 - ~ 68 . 7 6 • 5 55. 4 51 . 55. 6 52 . 6 
35. 0 32 . 4 41.6 40 . 2 
J a p an St ~tistical ye a r book, 1952, page 210 
Unfortunately, the fanatical venture of World 
War II not only vriped out Japan 1 s military forces but also 
deprived her of all her former colonie s ru1d ruinousl y damaged 
her industries . The plants established in the colonies were 
confiscat ed and factories at home ,.,ere bombed . The esti-
mated damag e wa s app r oximately¥ 6 , 500, 000 million. 88 
With United States· aid , the efforts of the Japanese 
government, and the Korean conflict during which J apan 
served as a military supply base to the United Nations' 
forces, the industries of Japan recovered with an amazing 
speed . However , the political , the social, and the eco-
nomical conditions that the Japanese . compani es have been 
I . 
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facing since war are qui t e different from those of the prewar 
era . 
Japan wa s under the occupation of the Alli ed Powers 
from 1945 to 1952 before the peace treaties were signed. 
During these 7 yea rs, the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers was the real admi nist rator of this occupied l and. 
The major efforts of this occupational government were to 
institute democracy and t o aboli sh all f orm s of feud alism, 
which wa s supposed to have fostered her mi l itarism. By 
the orde r of the Supreme Cotr .. mander, the Japane se mi l ita ry 
forces were disorganized, and the Japanese constitution was 
radically revised. All the QDdemocratic principles expres sed 
and i mplied in the old consti t ution were removed ru1d demo-
cratic idea s have been instituted . A large amount of lands 
owned by the absentee owners were redistributed to t he numerous 
tenant f a r mers so tha t the ag ricul t u r al se r f dom could be 
terminated . In order to prevent the extreme concentration 
of weal t h and economi c pm·rer in a few fami l ies and f or the 
purpose of distri buting income · to the majority, the Supreme 
Commander ordered the dis solution of Zaibatsu and establi shed 
the anti-trust law. Upon the diSSQlution of the Zaibatsu, 
General MacArthur stated .in his New Year Day's message to 
the Japanese people in 1948 as follows. 
E_conomically, allied policy ha s required the 
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breaking open of that system which in the 
past has permitted the major part of the 
commerce and industry and natural resources 
of your country to be o1~ed and controlled 
by a minority of feudal families and exploited 
for their exclusive benefits . The world · 
has probably never seen a counterpart to so 
abnormal an economic system. It permitted 
exploitation of the many for the sole benefit 
of the few . The integration of these fe\v 
with government was complete and their influence 
upon governmental policies inordinate, and 
set the course which ultimately led to war 
and destruction. It was indeed , so complete 
a monopoly as to be, in effect, a form of so-
cialism in private hands . Only through its 
dissolution could the way be cleared for the 
emergence of an economy conducive to the 
well-being of all the people an ecbnomy 
embodying the principle of private capitalism, 
based upon free competitive enterprise ; an 
economy which long experience has demonstrated 
alone provides the maximum incentive to the 
development of those fundamental requirements 
to human progress : 8 ~ndividual initiative and individual energy. ~ 
The efforts of freeing the country from feudalism and 
instituting democracy were not only confined to politics 
and economy but also extended to educational reforms . The 
nation's pre1.;ar educational system., vlhich gave the real edu-
cation to only the selective few was replaced with the 
American educational system, which tries to educate the mass 
for the democratic society. The previous teaching methods and 
materials had mad e the Japanese school system an effective 
tool for nationalist propaganda and forming in the people 
a blind obedience to their leaders . This was all weeded 
out . In the past , labor organiza tion was considered 
unfaithful and im ~oral. Any strike and any union's action 
95 
whose consequence .. was regarded harmful, 1.vere put down by 
police action . The Supreme·Commander legalized the orga-
nization of labor and made the union's action lawful, for the 
Supreme Comraander was given ' the following directions from the 
authori ty of Allied Powers . 
Encouragement shall be given and f acfur shovm 
to the development of organizations in labor, 
in industry , and agriculture, organized on a 
democratic basis . Policy shall be favored 
which permit a wide distribution of income 
and of ovmership of the means of production 
and trade . 90 
The encouragement of the Supreme Commander and ironically 
the instigation of Japan's communists have violently spurred 
the labor movement . Thus, the labor dispute , vJhich hardly 
existed before the end of the Pacific \'Jar , nm.,r becomes one 
of the toughest problems for the Danagement of the large 
Japanese companies . 91 The protected market in her colonies 
is now ho longer available to the Japanese companies . The . 
Japanese companies have to fight for their markets vli th inter-
nH.tional competitions . The zaib::tt su companies have no longer 
the support of the limitless financial funds of their parental 
companies , f or their parental companies were dissolved . All 
these changes have made the large Japanese companies .feel 
the necessity of strengthening their top management and 
improving the Lin- gi system. In order to mee t international 
.C ompetition and challenging situations at home , the top 
management of the Japanese companies has had to play a more 
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vital role in planning , pol i cy formula tion, and de ci sion 
r.1 aking . As a mean s of admi nistration and me t hod of control, 
the Lin- gi system is also f a cing a chang e and modi ..='i cation 
in this newl y devel oped situation . 
2 . The changes of the Lin- gi system 
Since the Lin- gi system requires that the Lin-gi 
documents be proce s s ed t hrough a predetermined channel and 
get the approvals of the president , the core of the system 
is the procedure rather than the approvals . The app r ovals 
or disapproval s Hill be obtained no matter what channel or 
procedure may be used . It is the procedure ad opted t hat 
affects the efficiency of the administra tion . It is, there-
fore , on the procedure that we should concentra te our efforts 
towa rd i mp rovement ·so that the system can be made an eff cetive 
me ·=tn s of administra tion. The follo-vring are some examples 
of i mprovement of the procedur e . 
(1 ). Establ i shing diff erent channel s f or 
classi f ied Lin- gi cases . 
It may be helpful to classify the Lin- gi ca ses 
into three kind s, namely special Lin- gi , personnel Lin-gi, 
and general Lin- gi so that the different kinds of t he Lin- gi 
ca ses nay be treated under t he di f f erent procedures . 
• Special Lin- gi 
The special Lin- gi cases are those f or vlhich the 
president should make his decisions . The se ~pecial Lin- gi 
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cases are primaril y drafted or planned by the heads of directly 
concerned departments, i·Tho, on these occasions, act as general 
staff to the president ; and after the cases have been drafted 
or planned, they a re submitted to the president f or decisions 
rather than approvals . The president may just adopt the plans 
as they are or give some revisions whi ch he considers necessary. 
In the special Lin-gi , the subordinates are not seeking the 
approval of the senior officers, but r a ther they , the initia tors 
of these cases, act as general staff to the president , and 
use the Lin-gi procedure as a means to submit their drafts 
or plans to the president . For exanple, J company specifie s 
the f ollovring affairs are within the ca tegory of the special 
Lin-gi cases . 
a . The determinations of the general business 
policies such as the operational policies , . 
the budget construction policy etc. 
b. The establi shment of the i r1portant fundamental 
pl ans and some important basic cases, such a s 
the production plans, major construction plans, 
ma jor repair works , the internal audi ting plans , 
the principal requirement of t he coverage of t he 
insurance policy, the standard stock level etc . 
c . The determination of the over-all budget . 
d . The monetary transactions \·Thich are not the 
pa rt of the usual bu~ines s operation of the 
company, such as the borrowing ~~d lending a 
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substantial anount of money and the becoming 
of guarantor of such transactions for others . 
e . The determination of the prices of the ma j or 
products . 
f . The designation of the persons to be in cha rge 
of the internal auditing and in spections and 
the determinations for adiinistering the 
unannounced.internal inspections . 
Obviously , it is the function of the president to 
make his decisions to adopt these plans vThich have been drafted 
by the head of the directly concerned department , examined 
by the he~ds of the related departments, and then submitted 
to him through the Lin-gi procedure . The nature of this 
procedure to hand up the plans is not the same a·s that of 
the general Lin-gi cases for which the subordinates are in 
a real sense seeking the approval of the seniors so t hat 
they can carry out their duties . 
It seens , therefore , adequate to have for the 
special Lin-gi a diff erent procedure from that for the 
general Lin- gi . The possible differences could be in the 
following points . 
i) . The officer who is design~ted to be in c a r ge of 
the Lin-gi documents . 
Generally, the head of the general affai rs 
department is in charge of all Lin- gi documents , but to 
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improve the handling procedure , the special Lin- gi would 
make the head of the directly concerned department in charge 
of handling the cases . The head of the sales department, for 
instance, would be put in charge of the special Lin-gi if 
that special Lin-gi document i s about the setting of the 
sales price of a product . The head of the controller's 
department would be in charge of the special Lin- gi case 
if this special Lin- gi document is about the budget policy. 
A company specifies that the head of the directly concerned 
department should submit the special Lin- gi and the personnel 
Lin- gi to the president aft er the Lin- gi document has been 
to the Jomukai or the Heetings of the executive directors 
for coordination. The detailed clerical procedure of 
presenting the special Lin-gi case shall be decided by the 
head of the directly concerned department . Thus, the special 
Lin- gi has a more simplified procedure than the general 
Lin- gi . 
ii ). The form of the Lin- gi document 
Having a different content, each special Lin-gi 
case is required to have its ovm fonn which sat isfies its 
need . It is very difficult , if not impossible, to design 
a fixed form to suit all the Lin- gi cases . Therefore, the 
forru may be adequately designed in each case . In the case 
of budget plans , for example , the regular budget form , which 
are cle ,..trly speci :~ ied in the budget regula tions , may be just 
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ad opted f or the Lin-gi document form on the budget cases. 
On this Lin-gi document form, it may have a sheet of cir-
culation form, which is also used in the general Lin-gi cases, 
for the circulation consultation purpose. 
iii) . Methods of consultation. 
There is not a definite method of consultation. 
However , the special Lin-gi cases are, in general , examined 
in one of the various committees and so it is not necessary 
to circulate these special Lin-gi documents to each of the 
related departments individually. Even in case there are no 
conm1itt ees established in the company for these purposes , these 
special Lin-gi documents are presented in the meetings in 
which those related individuals me et so that there is no 
need for circulat ion. 
iv). Following is the working procedure for the 
special Lin-gi documents, which is used in J Company . 
THE \vO~ I NG P O .... EDURE FOR T:1E SPECIAL LIN-GI 
Purpose: 
Based on X X rules of the Lin-gi regulations, 
this procedure shall define the working 
procedure for X X depa rtment head to construct 
the special Lin-gi cases . 
The making of the Lin-gi documents: 
X X department head shall direct his subordinates 
to make the special Lin-gi documents on the cases 
which are regulated to be treated as the special 
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THE \vOR:JNG PROCEDU... FOR THE SPECIAL LIN-G I ( continued) 
Lin- gi cases by X X rules of the Lin- gi regulations, 
and which fall within the fm1ctions of his 
department . 
Examination and Consultation: 
Forms: 
The special Lin- gi shall not be circulated for 
exar.1ination and consultation but shall be examined 
and consulted in the meetings of the concerned, 
which include the meetings of the committees . 
No special regulations shall be made to establish 
a :fixed form for the special Lin- gi . Hm·rever, upon 
the presentation of the special Lin-gi, a sheet of 
the circulation f orm , '\vhich is used in the general 
Lin- gi, shall be attached on the special Lin-gi 
document . The code and the numbers for the special 
Lin- gi documents and for the approvals shall be 
designated as follows . 
S. 1 . NO. X X 
s. A. NO . X X 
Approval notification: 
Presentee : 
X X department he d shall notify all the related 
individuals under his name as soon as the app roval 
is given to the special Lin-gi . 
The mainly concerned section chief of X X 
departnent shall take up the presentation 
procedures . 
B. Personnel Lin- gi 
J company sets the f ollowing affai rs to be within 
the category of the personnel Lin- gi . 
a . Decisions on the wage payment system and the 
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total amount for bonus . 
b. The making of the labor contracts . 
c. The establishment of the number of the r egular 
work force . 
d. The personnel affairs of the officers whose 
ranks are acting section chiefs or above . 
e. The monetary award for a certain group , ivhich 
exceeds X X dollars . 
In actuality , some of the personnel Lin-gi cases 
are those for which the president should make his decisions 
~nd others are those which should have the approval of the 
president , and so the former might be treated as the special 
Lin-gi and the latter might be treated as the general Lin-gi. 
However , the personnel Lin-gi cases a re all treated as an 
independent category. The re a son for treating the personnel 
Lin-gi as an independently separated kind is that the nature 
of the personnel Lin-gi cases does not allow them to be 
circulated for examination and cansultation to all the 
concerned departments. For its confidential nature and the 
reason of privacy, the personnel Lin-gi cases have been treated 
quite directly and separately by the head of the personnel 
department. The personnel Lin-gi, therefore, are neither 
included as a part of the special Lin-gi, nor to be treated 
as the gener al Lin-gi. The handling procedure of the 
personnel Lin-gi cases is the same as the special Lin-gi. 
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G. General Lin-gi 
The general Lin-gi cases are those Lin-gi cases 
which are not included in the special Lin-gi cases or 
covered as the personnel Lin-gi cases . They are the cases 
for v.rhich the subordinates are required to seek the approval 
of the president through the Lin-gi procedures so that they 
can be authorized to execute their duties. J company 
illustrates the general Lin-gi cases as follows. Wnen each 
of the following cases occur, the directly concerned unit is 
required to submit a Lin-gi document for approval. 
a . Gain or loss of a property of the company. 
b . The leasing or lending of a piece of property 
whose value exceeds X X dollars . 
c . The repair works , modifications , and additi 8ns 
of machines, the cost of ~1ich exceeds X X 
dollars . 
d . The purchase, salvage , and repair of tolls, 
instruments, and other goods if the cost of 
each case exceeds X X dollars . 
e . The gains or losses of the intangible properties 
such as patents, copy- rights, trade ma rks, 
mining rights etc . 
f . Extraordinary gains or losses of depreciable 
properties . 
g . Disbursement for the following purposes : 
i). Investment 
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ii) . Donation when exceeding X X dollars~ 
iii) . Hem be\ fees . 
iv) . Damage indemnity 
v) . Disposition of the uncollectible loans and 
writing off the bad debts . 
h . Organization 
i) . Creation or abolition of section, branch 
off ice, and other organizational chang es. 
ii) . Establishment and changes of the systems of 
the company , such as budget system, pricing 
system, i nspection system, bookkeeping system 
etc . 
iii) . Establishment and changes of the regulations 
of the company. 
i . Operation 
i) . Termination of i mportant operations. 
ii) . Changes in ma jor working methods . 
j . Negotiations and external relations . 
i ). Major contracts and negotiations . 
ii) . Designations of suppliers, dealers, 
the dealing banks . 
iii) . Any law suit . 
k . }iscellaneous affair s of importance 
i) . The important events and conferences 
ii ). The other i mportant affai rs included 
Lin-gi cases by the president . 
and 
in the 
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The classification of the Lin-gi cases shows that 
the general Lin-gi ca ses are in the majority. The moderniza-
tion of the handling procedure of the general Lin-gi cases 
is the reform most needed and the one which promises the 
greatest results . 
(2) . Improvement of the Lin-gi document form. 
The first step in the modernization of the pro-
cedure of the general Lin-gi should be in the i mprovement 
of the f orm used in the general Lin-gi docunent . Generally, 
the i terns irJ'hich should be included in a Lin-gi document a re 
predetermined by the Lin-gi regulations . In the case of T 
Company, their Lin- gi r egulations have listed that the fol-
lowing items should be included in a Lin-gi document . 
a . Classification ( special or general) 
b . I(inds of copy ( orginal copy or carbon copy) 
c . Kinds of the Lin- gi case 
d . Code and number 
e . The title name of the particular ca se 
f . The date of initiation and the name of the 
initiating section 
g . l<Ionetary ar.1ount . 
h . The code and NO . of the budge t allowance f or 
the ca se 
i . The date for starting the operation of the case 
j . The d ate of completion of the case 
k . The contents, reason s , and details . 
1 . The blank f or the individuals vrho have joined 
in the planning of the case 
m. The requirement of any operational report 
n . Specifications 
o. Estimations 
p . The schedule of purchases and so on. 
Hm·rever, T Company has made some i mprovements about 
the form for the general Lin-gi docunents in the foll owing 
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respects in 1961. 
a. Abolition of t he traditional vertical vlri ting 
and adoption of the horizontal writing f or the 
Lin-gi documents . 
b . Designing the forms for the Lin-gi documents 
by the nature of the Lin- gi cases . 
c . The distinction of the forms fo r the Lin-gi 
documents from the f orm of the circulation 
sheets . 
A. The adoption of the horizontal writing 
Traditionally, the J apane se document s were 
written from top to bottom and from right to left . This 
is called vertical '\lrri tings . For the convenience of using 
arabic numbers, filing procedures, and the trend of the 
westernization , more and more companies have been adopting 
horizontal writings in their documents . The horizontal 
'\·rri ting also helps make the document appear like a bill 
and is suited to itemization in statement . The itemization 
helps eliminate all unnecessary ceremonial phrases and 
flowery words but make statement in a simple and intelligible 
terms . 
B. The f orms for Lin-gi documents . 
The use of the typewriter and the f i l ing cabinets 
requires a certain kind and certain size of paper for the 
Lin- gi documents . In order to have uniformity in the forms 
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for the Lin- gi documents, a prototype form is designed for 
each kind of Lin-gi docu~ents . s a result of this prototype , 
the Lin- gi documents, which used to be radically different, 
no1..; have single form that is convenient to examine and sim-
plifies itemized statements . The prototype form N0 .1, which 
is used, for example , for a Lin-gi case of the construction 
of a warehouse, is divided into three sections in the first 
blank . The left section of the first blank is for the 
approval date and its code number; and the right section is 
alloted for the initiation date and its code number . 
The left section of the second blank is left for 
the president to give his seal and the right section of 
the same blank is for the head of the department or plant 
manager who is the initiator of the Lin-gi case . On the 
edge of the right section of the second blank , there are 
four small brackets which are for the individuals who have 
joined in drafting the Lin- gi case. The third blank is for 
the title of the Lin-gi case and its code number . These 
three blanks are the heading of the Lin- gi document form . 
The heading is in gene r al similar for all the Lin-gi docunent 
forms . The body of the form follmrs the heading and is 
divided into four parts in this prototype form . The first 
part is for the amount of the cost of the project; the second 
part, for the outline statment of the project; the third part , 
for the statement of reasons; and the final part , for the 
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attached documents . In the traditiona l practice, most of 
these parts, such as reasons, outline statement, etc . , are 
written in the type of wordy essay type descriptions, but 
now they are all clearly separated and itemization is used 
to simplify the statement . The whole Lin-gi cas e is expressed 
and summarized on one sheet of the prototype f orm. The details, 
of course, come in the attached documents . Thus, the forms 
and the expre s sions te11d to be standardized . As a result, 
the document control becomes more efficient than before . 
T Company specifies that the prototype fortl NO . 1 is to 
be used for the Lin-gi case s under the Rule 7-1 which is 
i n regard to the cases of gains or losses, and leading or 
lending of pr emises, machines , and other properties of 
the company; and under the Rule 7- III which is in rega rd 
to the cases of gains or losses of the depreciable 
propeTties •. 
C. The for~ for the circulation consultat ion 
In many companies, the f irst page of the Lin- gi 
document is still used f or the purpose of the circulation 
consultation . To have a form designed f or such a purpose 
and attached only vrhen it is needed mi ght help speed up 
the procedure . J Company has designed a fo r m for such 
purpose . A form desi ; ned like Form 2 gives a cl ear 
presentation of the method of processing the case . The 
form consists of three main par ts, namely request, 
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PROTOTYPE FO_ : NO . I 
Tnis form shall be used ior the cases under the 
rule 7-I and 7-III of the Lin-gi regulations . 
Approval Date 
LIN- GI DOCU:::ENT 
No . 
President 
Year Month Day 
Initiation Date 
NO . 
Nar.ae of the 
department head 
of plant manager 
J Title ( code NO . ) 
A. L . NO . 10 
A Construction of a '\'iarehouse 
(1) . A:.10unt of Budget All 0'\·Tan c e 
$ i 
Sub total (1) XX Cost $ t 
¥ 
(2) XX Cost $ l 
(2). OUtline Statement of the vlork 1---l 
t 
f 
I 
(items to be purchased ) 
(3). Reasons 
( i) • • ... •• 
( ii) ••••••• 
(iii) ••••• 
(4). Attached Documents and Details . 
(i) 
(ii) 
~ 
i 
I 
f 
I 
-
110 
consultation , and approval according to the normal Lin- gi 
Procedure . 
In the request part , there are blanks for the 
title of the case , its code number , the outline statement 
of the case, and the seals of the individuals who have joined 
in the planning of the case . The first blank of the con-
sultation part is reserved for the opinions of the head of 
the directly concerned depart~ent . The rest of the space 
of the consultation part is f or the seals and remarks of the 
consultees of department head level and the directors ' level . 
In the bottom of the consultation part, there is a little 
space reserved f or filling the date when the case is presented 
to the Jomukai or the executive comnittee . By having the 
opinions of the head of the directly concerned department 
in the first bl ank of the second part , the consultees are 
asked to express whether they are f or or against the 
opinions of the head of the directly concerned department , 
or if they have their opinions in regard to the case . Their 
opinions should be given in the remark blank and this 
arrangement makes the consultees clearly indicate what they 
mean when giving their seal s on the paper. A seal without 
a remark does not reveal whether the seal mero1s agreement 
to the plan or JUst that the document has been read . This 
arrangement certalnly has corrected this ambiguity of the 
meanings of the seals . 
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After the establishment of the Jonukai, some 
Lin-gi cases are still consulted through the original cir-
culatory route while some others are presented to the weekly 
conference of the Jomukai for consultation. Thus, a small 
blank is provided in the bottom of the second part for filling 
the date when the case is presented to such a conference . 
The opinions arrived in the conference will be recorded in 
the remark blank. The approval part is completely reserved 
for the president to give his directions, seals of approval 
and to authorize the amount of money to be spent. After 
the approval, the Lin-gi document attached with this form 
of circulatory consultation will be sent back to the docu-
oent section of the general affairs department for keeping 
in file . 
(3). The clarification of the specific duties 
and authorities of the Lin-gi document 
examiners 
Since @any individuals are involved in the examina-
tion of the Lin-gi documents during the whole process of the 
procedure, the clarification of each individual's duties 
with regard to the Lin-gi documents may help eliminate the 
overlapping of the work, prevent unnecessary delay , and 
speed up the handling time. Generally, the Lin-gi documents 
are examined in two respects, n 2mely external forms and the 
internal materials . 
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A. The examination of the external forms. 
The examination of the external forms of the Lin-
gi documents shows whether the right forms have been used, 
and \vhether they have been processed wi tn the correct 
procedure . This examination is centered on checking in 
general the formality of the documents and not examining 
any part of the contents of the documents . Generally, this 
formal examination is the duty of the head of the general 
affairs department , \vho, therefore, can reject any of the 
Lin-gi documents vn1en it does not meet the qualifications 
to be treated as a Lin-gi case . If the form of any Lin-gi 
document does not meet the demand of the specification, the 
general affairs department should help correct the fo~ . 
The heqd of the general affairs department should also have 
the responsibility and authority to control the Lin-gi 
docuEent in process , to notify all the concerned parties 
when the Lin-gi documents get approved, and store the 
processed Lin-gi documents . The head of the general affairs 
department has also the responsibility to formulate the 
office vmrk procedures to present the Lin-gi documents. 
B. The examination of the internal materials 
For the convenience of explanation , the depa rtment 
head, who is directly concerned \'lith a Lin-gi case shall be 
called the department he ad in charge and t.!1ose department 
heads who are concerned only in part and are consulted for 
the Lin-gi case, shall be called the consulting depatment 
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heads . The so called examination of the internal naterial 
is conducted by both the depa rtment head in charge and the 
consulting department heads . The department head in charge 
has the responsibility t o cla rify all kinds of doubts and 
questions in regard to the contents of the Lin- gi case 
Whenever these kinds of doubts and questions arise in the 
minds of the consulting denartment heads and the president . 
He is obliged to find out the facts and answers from the indi -
Viduals who have participat~d in the planning and drafting of 
the case , in case he is not able to answer the questions put 
to him. He has also the duty to coordinate and synthesize 
the dissenting opinions among the consultees . As a staff 
assistant to the president, he can not reject any Lin- gi 
docun1ent passed the formal examinat i on . However , he can give 
his c omment , or disagree with the Lin- gi case completely if 
he regards the contents of the Lin- gi document too improper . 
(4). Establishment of the procedural control of 
the Lin- gi docun1ent presentation 
The improvements in the f orms of the Lin-gi docu-
ments and the clarification of the responsi bilities of the 
Lin- gi document examiners are all for the purpose of 
speeding up the handling ' procedure . Another way to speed 
up the procedure is to make clear the flow of the Lin- gi 
docun1ents . The f ollowing are a few means to clarify the 
flow of the Lin- gi documents and the procedure under the 
control . 
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a . A f low chart for the Lin-gi documents 
b . Processing cards 
c . The speci f ic Lin- gi document handl er 
d . A system for the examination i n advance 
e . A record of the Lin- gi documents under 
process 
f . A report on the execution of the approved 
Lin- gi documents 
A. A flow chart for the Lin- gi documents 
The Lin-gi system is a procedure to handl e the 
Lin-gi documents . In order to i mp rove the system it is 
necessary to know the exact flm-r of the Lin- gi documents, 
from the birth of the documents to their destruction. 
With this pattern of flow in hand, a person can concentr ate 
his efforts on the i mprovement of the f low. As the cha rt 3 
shows , the Lin- gi document is draf ted by a section in a plant 
or in a department of the head off ice . Then, the draf t \·Jill 
be submit t ed to the plant manager or the department head f or 
approval . After the approval the draft vlill be made into a 
Lin-gi document and an entry will be made bef ore the Lin-gi 
document is sent to the documents section of the general 
affairs department . The documents sec t ion makes a l ist of 
the Lin- gi documents received and a processing card , and 
when needed , attaches t he f orm f or the circul a to r y 
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consul t a tion . The formal examina tion and the designation 
of the departments to be consulted are carr ied out i n the 
general affai rs department . A docuoent may be rejected 
under the name of the head of the general affairs department 
if the document does not mee t the quali fi cation to be treated 
as a Lin-gi ca-se . As soon a s the f ormal examination is done, 
the original document is fo~varded to the department in 
charge and a needed number of the duplicate copies a re at 
the meantime distributed to the consulting dep artments, where 
the examina tion of the internal material takes place. The 
head of the department in charge puts do~1 his opinions about 
the case, answers the questions from the consulting departments, 
gives his seal on the document, and hands it down to the 
document handler , '\vho ha s to record the case, and checks 
the processing card wi th the gener al affairs department 
before he sends out the original Lin-gi document to the 
con sulting departments. 
When the original copy of the Lin-gi docunent 
arrives at the consulting depart 1 ents, the consultees have 
already studied the case, known the facts , and clarified all 
the doubts and questions '\vi th the head of the department 
incharge, f or they have received duplicate copies from the 
general aff a irs depa rtment at the time vrhen t he department 
in charge has the original copy. The consul tees wi ll study 
t e opinions of the head of department in cha rge and give 
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their pros or cons or opinions as the original copy of the 
Lin- gi document comes to them. They hand down the document 
of both duplicate copy and origi nal copy to the document 
handler a s soon as they give their seals and opinions . Then 
the document handler checks the processing ca rd '\vi th the 
general affairs department before they submit the documents 
to the secretary of the president . The ca se is then revi ewed 
in the Jonukai and forwarded to the president for the final 
approval . After the ~ocument gets approval, it is returned 
to the documents section of the gener al affairs department, 
which is to notify by a written state! ent all the concerned 
dep artments . The original copy of the Lin-gi document will 
be stored in the docunents section f or a certain length of 
time . 
Upon the receipt of the approval notification, 
the i nitiating unit of the Lin-gi case can start on their 
project and they are required to subi!li t a conpletion report 
to the documents section when the project is completed . 
The submitted completion report is filed tog a ther with the 
original docuraent and store away for a certain length of time. 
Generally, the documents are kept for about two to three years 
though the exact length of time diff ers in each case . This 
is the complete f low of the Lin-gi documents . 
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A FLOW CH"' RT OF THE LIN- GI DOCilliE~JTS 
Step A. The naking of the Lin- gi documents . 
1 . Occur the case. 
2 . Hake draft . 
I nitia t or 3. Get approval of the department 
head or the plant m1.n n.ger. 
Step B. Acceptance 
I 
Documents 
Section, 
General Affairs 
Department 
4. Hake document . 
5. Hake record . 
1 . Get accepted . 
2. Hake record . 
3 •• Nake processing card . 
4 Formal examination. 
5. Jesignate the conce1ned 
departments . 
6 . Attach a circulatory f orm. 
7. Distribute copies . 
Step c. Consultation 
I l e Cone to the specific document 
handler . 
The Department 
in cha rge . 
The Consultees . 
I 
' 
J 
Step D. Approval 
President . 
Step E. Follow- up 
General Affairs 
DepartrJent . 
2 . Hake record . 
3 •• Examines, gives remarks and seals . 
It Hand down to the docuEent handler. 5. Check the processing card . 
1 . Come to the respective document 
handler 
2. Attach the original copy . 
3 •• r1ake record . 
4 Consultees examine and give seals . 
5. Hand down to the document handler . 
6. Check the processing card . 
1 . Come to the secretary . 
2. Eake record . 
3 •• To the Jom.ukai . 
4 President examines and approves . 
5. Hand down to the secreta ry. 
1 . Not ify approval . 
2 . Check the record . 
3. Keep the original copy. 
4. Receive the completion report . 
5. File and store . 
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B. The making of the processing card . 
Once a~in-gi document leaves the documents section 
for the routine procedure, it will not come back to the docu-
ments section for weeks. During this period of absence from 
the docu~ents section, it is very difficult to locate the 
docmaent . The document is almost lost for such a period of 
time . To correct this weakness, the processing card is 
devised . As soon as the Lin-gi document gets to the documents 
section from the initiator a processing card is made and kept 
in the documents section. Each time, the Lin-gi document is 
moving one department to another, the document handler of the 
previous department is obliged to check the processing card 
\vi th the documents section. Thus, the processing card becomes 
the· controlling card by vlhich the Lin-gi document can always 
be located . The check of the processing card makes clea r 
also how many days each department has spent for examining 
the document , and so the system of keeping the processing 
card helps indirectly speed up the handling procedure . 
c. The specific Lin-gi document handler 
In a l a rge company, each department should have 
a specific person to handle the incoming and outgoing 
documents, so that any inquiry regarding the documents can 
be quickly replied . 
D. A system f or the examination of the internal material 
in advance 
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Originally , the consultees can not begin their 
examinations of the internal materials of the Lin-gi cases 
until the original Lin-gi documents have come to them. 
Again, each consultee has to wait f or his turn for the 
document to be circulat ed to him. As the number of the 
consultees increases, the time of waiting is lengthened . 
It also prolongs the time f or the vlhole process of procedure . 
The provision of a certain number of duplicate copies enables 
each consultee to begin examini ng the case at the same time . 
As a matter of fact , the consul tees can begin their exami- ., 
nation as ea rly as can the depart~ent in charge . This system 
certainly helps minimize the waiting time and speed up the 
processing of the Lin-gi documents . 
E. A record of the Lin- gi documents under the process 
Each month the general affairs department shall 
make a list of the Lin-gi documents which are not yet 
completely processed and in the record of the documents 
under the process . The general affairs department shall 
distribute a copy of such a list to each depa rtment so that 
the departments in charge can know how many of their Lin-gi 
documents have not yet been processed . This also becomes a 
driving force to urge the concerned departments to process 
the documents as soon as possible . 
F. A report on the execution of the approved Lin-gi document 
The execution of the Lin-gi ca ses is carried out 
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either through the purchases and completion of the \vorks, or 
merely through the completion of the payment . Each month 
the initiator of a Lin- gi case is requested to make such a 
report to inform the head of the general affairs department . 
With this inf ormation , the general affairs department can 
keep their fi l ed document up to date . 
( 5) . Budget control and the Lin-gi system 
Soon after 1950, the idea of the controll er's 
depa rtment wa s introduced to J apan through the scholars and 
industrialists of the United St ates , and wa s seri ously dis-
cussed by the Japanese people in the industries . Around 
1952, many J apanese companies began establishing the con- ' 
troller's department and Jomukai , which is a copy of the 
management committee of the American companies . In the 
following I shall examine how the establishDent of the con-
troller's department and Jomukai affect the Lin-gi system. 
A. The influence of the system of budget control 
The main a im of the controller's department is 
to gain a system of control through establishment · of the 
budget syst em , pricing system, bookkeeping system, and 
many other internal control systems . In the very beginning 
the Lin-gi system wa s devised as a means of control and 
administration, before the other internal control system, 
such as budget system , wa s knmm. The establishment and 
adoption of the budget system is, therefore, destined to 
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decrea se the role played by the Lin-gi system. Those cases 
which have to seek the approval of the president are specified 
so that the president can have direct and individual control 
on these cases of some i mpo r tance, for there is no other 
means of control . In other \•rords, those ca ses which require 
the approval of the president become the Lin-gi ca ses because 
there is no budget system established for the operation of 
the business . The presideat must, therefore, make a decision 
whenever one of these ca ses occurs. With the establishment 
of the budget systEm , the president needs only examine the 
budget and gives approval for the budget. It is no longer 
necessary for him to control each of these cases sepa r a tel y 
and individually. He might still make decisions on some 
cases of great im~ortance, yet the number of these ca ses is 
greatly reduced . 
B. ~ne possibility of judging each Lin-gi ca se with the 
over-al l view 
The budget system enabl es the president to judge 
each Lin-gi case \rl ~ . th an over-all view. Without a budget 
the president judges case by case, not knowing how much 
the expenditures vlill add up to in the end . In order to 
insure making ends meet, the decisions of the president 
tend to become negative . With the budget in hand, the 
president can judge each case, knowing the prospective total 
expenditures in the f iscal year . He will f ind it easier 
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to make deci sions th2n before . The Lin-gi cases of the 
cons t ruction of the plant facilities shall be given in 
the follovdng illustration. If the president examines the 
Lin-gi cases one by one, it will be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to foretell how much the total expenditures f or 
the construction of plant facilities may be in a year. 
However , it is still not appropriate to stop the Lin-gi 
procedure for the cases of the constructions of the plant 
facilities vrhi ch require a very substantial amount of capital 
and quite advanced technology, even when the budget f or con-
struction of the plant facilities is established. Each year , 
the budget fo"r construction of the plant facilities may be 
formulated and submitted for approval as a special Lin-gi 
case. Wnen a case of the construction of the plant facility 
may occur, it may be treated ~s a general Lin-gi case and 
a Lin-gi document be made. In this general Lin-gi document , 
there should be attached the blue prints, estimations, 
detail work schedules, and other necessary data, even though 
the expenditure of the project is already included in the 
budget which is approved as the special Lin-gi case. In this 
situation, the problem of the needed capital ha s already 
been solved and so the examination of the internal material 
may be centered on the technical problem and the relationship 
between the disbursement and the period of construction work. 
The introduction of the budget system to the Japanese companies 
has contributed to minimize the Lin-gi cases and to reduce 
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the role of the Lin-gi system. 
(6). The Jomukai vs the Lin- gi system 
In 1950 , Japan revised her commercial law and 
a board of directors was required f or every lawful joint 
stock corporation, which is almost without exception the 
form of the large business concerns in Japan. Through 
the resolutions of the bnard of directors, a number of the 
r epresentative directors , who shall l awfully r epresent the 
company , will be elected . Legally , the board of directors, 
which represents t he company , and elects the representative 
. . 
directors to carry out the decisions made by the board , is 
the highest author i ty of the company. But in r eality , the 
representative directors alvrays influence the decisions of 
the boar d of directors , f or in small companies , the pre sident 
alone is the only representat i ve director and holds the 
majority shares of the stocks of the company, and in a 
l a rge company , the number of the representative directors 
ma.y add one or two mor e from the vice president, managing 
directors or executive directors . When a company is very 
large , t1vo or three representat ive directors are not enough 
to run the company. In order to take up the top management 
functions effectively , ther e is a t endency to strengthen the 
top executives. In the companies of ·the west , there is 
the manag ement committee and so in Japan , the representative 
directors pick up the rest of tne re sident executive directors 
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and organize the Jo::mkai . The Jomukai meets as freque~l.tly 
as one to four times every week. By origin, Joruukai is an 
organ which is to examine the administrative policies, l ong 
range plans, and _· or consultation of the president. It is 
not an organ to make decisions, but it does make decisions 
in practice . Sometime , the heads of the departments are 
asked to attend the meEtings of the Jomukai . In reality, 
the Jomukai in the J apanese companies plays the role of the 
top m~nagement and changes the one-man-control-type of 
manag ement into the team-v:ork-type . The Jormkai is al so the 
brain trust of the pres i dent . 92 
A. The change of ~he examination of the Lin-gi documents by 
each individual in private to the examination of the 
Lin-gi documents by the group in pubiic . 
Originally, the Lin- gi systeo requi res a Lin-gi 
case to be transf ormed into the Lin-gi document which should 
be examined and given opinions by each of all the concerned 
department heads in private . These opinions are given for 
the purpose of guiding and assisting the presi dent to make 
a correct judgment on the Lin-gi case . The president can 
still disregard these opinions and make his own judgment 
when even these opinions are appropriate . This system is 
far from democratic and can hardly be regardly a s favoring 
the opinions of majority. 
Upon the establishment of the Jomukai, all those 
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cases which need the app r oval of the president are examined 
and coordin~ted in the Jomukai with the attend~nce of all the 
concerned department heads . Under this arrangement, the 
initiator ·and the consultees are no longer to examine these 
Lin-gi cases in private but in group and in confer ence . 
The opinions of each individual are now thoroughly discussed 
and their judgments tend to be more objective than before . 
This arrangement also elimina tes the autocratic judgment of 
the president . This change of the examination me thod from 
the circulation to the conf erence indicates that the J Qpanese 
management has departed from autocracy and come closer to 
democracy. 
B. Speeding up the Lin-gi procedure 
Under the circulat ion of exrunining the Lin-gi 
document, it is very difficult to speed up the handling 
procedure if any member of the concerned department head s 
is absent or puts off the examination of the document . 
But under the conference method of examining the documents , 
the Lin-gi initiators of the Lin-gi cases can try to present 
their doctunents only on the days when the Jomukai has meetings 
so that their cases would be examined and get approved faster 
than by the other method . 
(7). The specialization of the planning functions 
vs, the Lin-gi system 
Since the appearance of the controller 's department 
• 
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in the Japanese compani es, the manag ement of the J apanese 
companies ha s ente r ed the stage of the control by f i gures. 
The management no longer remains dependen t on intui t i on and 
the primitive method of trial ~nd error, but ha s come to use 
scienti fi c planning f or its busi ness operation. Planning is 
the other side of control and is the core of the modern 
management . As the size of a company grows, and its ope r a tion 
gets complicated, the need of planning incre a ses . The need 
of planning is doubly necessitated by t he advancement of 
technol ogy . The huge capital inve s t ment, mas s production, 
and the keen competition all make planning es sent ial to the 
success of the business operation . The essence of the 
competit i on among conpanies rests more on the success of 
Planning than on the efficiency of the execution of works. 
It is now the planning that decides , mo st of t he time, the 
success or failure of a company in the batt l e of competi t i on. 
In the~e few yea rs, long range planning has been much talked 
about and the e st abl ishment of management planning is widely 
discus s ed . The establ ishment of the management planning is 
having stronger i mpact on t he Lin-gi system than ever bef ore. 
A. The establ i shment of the manag ement planning and the 
Lin-gi system 
a . The need of the general staff for the 
management planning . 
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The assistances of the general staff are not much 
needed when the president takes up and exronines the Lin-gi 
document s case by case . However , should a l ong r ange and 
integrated over-all plan be establ ished, there arises the 
need of the assistance of the general staff . Generally, most 
of the large companies in Japan have adopted the departmental 
line organization. The duties of each department are cle arly 
specified . The department heads are both l ine authorities 
within the affai rs related to their duties and staff members 
to the president by being consultees in the Lin-gi system. 
The strong points of this organization are that the 
channel of comt and within a department is direc t and simple; 
the duty and author i ty of ea ch department are clea r l y specift ed. 
Yet this organi zaion ha s its weakr.ess too. The communication 
from the bottom up or along the same level is rather ineffi-
cient and diff icul t; the authority is highl y concentra ted at 
the top and the delegation o.L' authority is ha rdly practiced; 
the execution of the duties of each department tends to become 
incomplete . Without the system of job specifi cation, the 
individuals within a department alway s work togather as a 
group and no spec ific responsibility and au thori ty a re given 
to each individual . The coordination among the depar t ments 
is difficult, f or each dep art ent is too much occupied with 
its own j o b s • 9 3 
By considering its production f acili t i es, the 
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manufacturing department , f or example , would set up a 
Production plan villich would enable the plants to run at the 
full production capacity. The sales department would, in 
turn , have a sal es plan based on the line that is in great 
demand , considering the need of their major customers . Yet 
the controller ' s department would formulate )§heir budgets 
based on the most profitable products . Considering only for 
their ovm efficiency and convenience each department tends 
to make their plans based on the i r departmental considerations . 
As a company , the management should make an integrated pro~ 
duction plan i.Vhich ha s taken the considera tions of production 
facilities , market need , and prof i tability. In orde r to 
establi sh such plans , it is necessary , therefore, to have 
some special i zed persons to attend on the plaru1ing functions . 
The production plans , t he budget plans , or other 
plans of this nature are rather on a short range base and 
the emphasis of these short range integrated plans is 
mainly on the coordination and cont r ol of such plans in that 
short period of time . Taking the f uture of a company into 
the consideration , the management should have long range 
and over-all plans and planning principles . Speaking of 
the integration of the pl ans1 the management should make 
the integrated plans which have synthesized the capability 
of each department and v:hich have also closely tied the 
relations of men , material , production fac ilities , and 
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capital . To make such plans, the management needs very much 
the assistances o~ the general sta~~ or a spec i alized 
department ~or such pu rposes . 
i). Committees which play the rol e o~ the general 
sta~f 
Generally, the committees of the various narnes, 
if 'vell appl i ed , can be used to synthesize the departmental 
line organization . The committees, therefore, play the role 
of the general st_aff, though not completely . The management 
plans by the committees, f or example , may look as follows . 
IJoNTJtAU 
~~!iL~~§"! ~§1 
1 · ------------r~_-----r------------- ·-,~-~---·--· .... _ 
sales Plan L:roduction , ·roti"S£rucllj BuctJet Committee Plan 1 Plan Plan Committee[~ Committee Committee 
'---"-- _........._ - ~~~W;:M'~Ji. 
~-----1-Syn~=~x;~ ~~~~~ 
The management plans all go t hrough the management 
committee, as the name sugg ests, and are decided in the 
Jomukai . Directly under the ma.Y).ag emen t committee, there are 
the long- range plan special cowmittee and the synthesized 
over-all pl~ committee . For the short range pla~ s, there 
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are the sales, the production, the construction, and the 
budget committees . The long range plan special committee 
t akes up onl y the long range pl ans while the syn t he sized 
over - all plan committee mal;:es semi-annually a general ove r -
all plan which is synthes i zed all the short range pl ans. 
These short range plans should be planned by the se vari ous 
committees and yet in practice, the se short r ange plans are 
d r afted and f ormulated by their various dep artments, vrhi ch 
a re also the off ices of the committees. The purpose of 
ha:ving these various committees to make the plans is to 
gain the coordination among the departments . Yet, t he 
committees, in most of the time, examine the plan s d r afted 
and prepared by the departments me r el y f or form's sake . As 
a r esul t, these short range plans a re still not well 
synthesi zed or well coordi nated , taking the company as a 
whol e . 
ii) . An independent department of the general staff 
Knowing the weakness of the committee to uake plans, 
many companies have established an i ndependent department 
manned with general staff . In 1959, Keiei KenkytJ.sho ( I-ian-
agement Rese arch Institute of Japan) investigated 75 f airly 
l ar~e companies and found 66 o~~panies out of 75 had an 
independen t depa rtment of general staff . In some comp ru1ies, 
the ·general staff are scattered in tv10 departments . Name s 
used for this depa rtment are somewhat different . The n ames 
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found in the investigation are the following . 
1 . Kigabu ( Planning Department) 
2 . Kandibu ( Control Department) 
3. Chosabu ( Investigation Department) 
4. Shachoshitsu (The presid nt •s room) 
5. Soumubu ( General Affairs Department) 
6. Gyomubu ( Administrative Department) 
7. Seizo Kigabu ( Planning and ·,:anufacturing 
Dep ~'3. rtment) 
8. Jigyobu ( Undertaking Department) 
The general staff functions, such as planning, 
budget control , price control, internal auditing , and 
organizing are at times split between either tvro of the 
above mentioned departments . Generally, one of these de-· 
pa rtments is divided into three or four sections . The 
planning department of S Conpany , f or example, is divided 
into three sections . 
Planning Department 
1 . Planning section 
The specified functions of t his section 
are: 
a . The planning of the additional 
field or the changed field of 
business . 
b . The research and the inves-
tigation that are necessary 
to the formulation of the 
business policies . 
c. The over-all planning f or the 
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management of the subsidiary 
companies . 
d . The development of resources . 
e . T'.ae exaraina tion of the Lin-gi 
cases . 
f . The clerical works for the 
planning committee. 
2 . Budget Section 
The sp_ecified functions of the secion 
are:. 
a . The formulation of the over-all 
budget . 
b . Pricing control and the other 
related matters . 
3. Investigation Section 
The specified functions of this section 
are: 
a . The research on the general 
conditions of economy. 
b . The matte~s associated with the 
paten ts and the copy ri ghts . 
c . The tech.lJ.ology control vTi th the 
related matters . 
d . The clerical work of the re-
sea rch committee. 
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e . The research and the findings 
fo r the new products . 
b . The establishment of the management plans and 
policies vs the Lin- gi cases wnich the president 
should make decisions( or ~he special Lin-gi 
cases) 
As the use of the general staff is establ ished in 
the formulation of policies and the making of management 
plans , the system of the management is no longer centered on 
giving approvals to the individualistic Lin- gi cases vlhich 
originate in the low level of the management and are submitted 
to the top . Having the planning staffs to make the business 
Plans and policies , the management now flows from the top 
dovm. The management can shmv the business policies to the 
dep~rtments , and h ave the business plans for all . In the 
past , the management stayed in the back and controlled 
their work force through the hi ghly centralized authority. 
Now , the manag ement supplied with the exact policies and 
plans by their general staff , comes out to the front, and 
guides their work force and becomes very positive management . 
Without having the established department of the general 
sraff , the scope of the management planning was rather narrow 
in the past . As more emphasis is given on the m&nagement 
planning , the activities of the department of the general 
staff increase and the scope of the m~Dagement planning 
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widens . As a resul t, the number of the special Lin-gi cases 
on the general plans and policies increa ses . These increased 
special Lin-gi cases are f ormula ted by the general staff and 
presented either at the synthesi zing committee for clo se 
examination and at Jomul{ai for resol ution . These ca ses 
are still called as special Lin-gi cases by naoe and yet 
they a re practically the resolution ca ses of the Jomukai, 
for they no longer retain the nat ur e of the Lin-gi case s . 
B. The del egation of author ity hel ps reduce the nm1ber of 
the general Lin-gi cases '\·lhich should seek the approval 
of the president. 
a. The establishment of t he management plans and 
policies vs the deleg ation of authority. 
When there are no established busi nes s pl ans and 
poli cies, it i~ necessary to control each case separately 
through t he Lin-gi procedure . Once t he management plans and 
pol icies a re establ ished, the manag ement can, v1 .:. thin t he 
scope of the pl ans and policies, del egate the authority to 
the lower off ices to execute their duties. The establi sh-
ment of the budget system ha s a l r eady enabl ed t he manag ement 
to delegate authority to the lower level to a certain extent, 
and the provisions of the manag ement plans and policies 
enlarges the extent of the authority dele gated . 
K Coupany, f or exal'tple, has del egated the authority 
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to a very great extent to the lmver levels. K Coupany has 
diversified its operation and decentralized its organization 
by having the executive directors head d ifferent divisions . 
This decentralized organization is called divisionalization 
in which the head of each division is given nea~ly the cam- . 
plete autonomy in the operation of that division. 
The organization of the divisionalization is that 
many small divisions remain like many satellite units around 
the head office . These small divisions are like many in-
dependent manufacturers, for they have their O'Wll sales 
department, manufacturing department, personnel department, 
accounting department, and are given autonomy in making sales 
plan , production plans, and adopting m~ accounting system, 
personnel policies as long a s they are observing the general 
plans and policies given by the head office . The head office, 
the center of these small divisions and the place ,.,here the 
top management of the company still remains, has all kinds 
of staff depa rtments, such as the planning department, general 
affairs department, personnel department, sales department, 
manufacturing department, etc . In an oversimplified chart, 
the organization of the divisi onalization looks as follow . 
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The Boa rd of Directors 
l President l 
I Jonukail 
Cor:1ptl.ro11er I 
Personnel ~- :f It . J.' anu ~c urlng Sal'es 
The division head s are asked to report and keep 
the president informed of the events of significant im-
portance and the prog ress of the operations from time to 
time . Now the authority is very greatly delegated to the 
divisions and sone Lin-gi case s are so classified that they 
only need to get the approvals of the division heads , even 
though a f et-r Lin-gi cases a re still required to get the 
approval of the president .94 
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b . The defining of authority. 
The delegation of authority may very well result 
in the confusion ~1d ambigu'ty of responsibility if there is 
no system which defines the authority and responsibi l ity of 
~ach job . To define the authority and responsibility of 
jobs, job sepcification, job description, or the combination 
of the both is used . With this system, the authority and 
responsibility of each job are clearly specified and the 
delegation of authority becomes possible . 
K Company has defined the authority and responsi-
bility of X X plant manager of :t-' a chine division by the job 
de scription . 
The job description of X X plant manager, 
Hachine Division, looks as follow. 
A. Principal Function 
The plant manager should direct and control 
the sales, production, and the other general 
administrative duties of the plant. 
B. Authority and Responsibility 
With the objectives of accomplishing the above 
mentioned function , the plant manager should 
execute the f ollovTing duties and bear the 
responsibility of the operation ·and achievement 
of the plant . He is given the authority to 
execute the duties assigned to him except 
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those regulated Lin-gi cases . He is 
also obliged to make reports to the 
president on the matters of i mportance . 
1) . Basic duties and authorities 
a . Based on the basic business policies 
of the company, he should make nis 
own policies and plans suitable for 
operation of the plant . 
b . He should have the control and co-
ordinate the operational activities 
of the plant; inspect and examine 
the progress of the operation; 
direct and notify the approvals; 
and try to promote the operation of 
the plant . 
c . He shall approve the sales plan , and 
major sales contracts . 
d . ne shall approve purchase pl ans, and 
major purchasing contracts . 
e . He shall approve the agreements and 
negotiations conducted within t he 
need of the plant . 
f . He shall approve the production plans 
and supervise the plans to be carried 
out . 
l~ 
g . He shall direct to do the research 
for new and improved products, and to 
open new market . 
h . He shall direct the subordinates to 
improve working procedure , make 
changes in control methods, research 
on the new technology, such as the 
standards procedures, standard 
techniques, and give approvals. 
i . He shall give directions to the 
subordina~es to make policies to 
improve product quality and to 
reduce the cost of production. 
2). Organization 
a . In order to adapt to the changing 
conditions of the company and the 
industry , he shall formulate from 
time to time an effective policy 
to smoothly operate and control 
the organization. 
b . He shall make and adjust the 
necessary regulations within the 
plant . 
3) . Personnel 
a . He shall apnrove the personnel 
policies prepared by the personnel 
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depa rtment of the plant and complete 
the due formalities. 
b . He shall direct the personnel de-
partment to make training and edu-
cational programs and supervise the 
enforcement of the programs . 
c . He shall supervise the supervisory 
personnel and rate their achievements. 
d . He shall approve the awards and 
punitive actions f or the employees 
prepa red by the respective super-
visors . 
e . He shall give the directions on 
safety and health. 
f . He shall formulate plans to treat 
the grievances of the employees. 
g •. He shall give directions to formulate 
the plans for placement of the em-
ployees. 
4-). Reports. 
a . a e shall make reports t o the presi-
dent from time to time the progress 
and achievements of the operation. 
5) . Income and disbursement. 
a . The income from sal es and other 
sources shall be under his control . 
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b . He shall approve the disburser~ent 
reque sted by his subordinates when 
the disbursement is required . 
6). The others . 
In the operation of the pl ant, he shall 
make necessary coordination with the 
depa rtment heads in the head office . 
The job description has very well defined the au-
thority of the plant manager who is through the divisional i zed 
organization delegated 1.·1ith a very large authority. 
The Lin- gi system is a means of administra tion and 
a method of internal control in the large organizations ·or 
Japan . Documents are made , examined , coordinated , approved, 
notified, executed , and reported vrhenever the cases of some 
i mportance in the operation occur. This system provides a 
fairl y good control in the administration '\.oJ'hen t he number 
of the Lin- gi cases are limited to only those of the real 
i mportance , and manageabl e amount for the top executives . 
This system may very well accompl i sh the top management 
functions when the company has unchallengeabl e financial 
strength and protected ma rkets . However, the number of the 
Lin- gi cases will incre ase greatly '\vhen t he s i ze of the com-
pany grows l a r ger and the operations get complicated . 
The advancement in sciences and technological innovations 
intensi fy the market competitions . As the mar ket competition 
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gets more intensified, so the management is required to· pay 
more emphasis and efforts on the marketing and planning . 
The leadership rather than the control of the management 
is the essential to the success of operations . By the 
original Lin-gi system, the initiation of planning, policy 
making , and operations are all in the hands of the lower 
management, and top management is kept busy with approval 
giving and negative controls . Thus, the Lin- gi system tends 
to become obsolete and ineffective means of administration. 
Modifications and i mprovements can correct these weaknesses 
and make the system effective again . The possible improve-
ments can be made in the following respects. 
1 . Establishment of t he processing channels . 
2 . Improvement of the Lin-gi document forms . 
3. The clarification of the specific duties and 
authorities of the Lin-gi document examiners. 
4. Establishment of the procedural control of the 
Lin-gi document presentation . 
5. Adoption of budget control 
6. Establishment of the Jomukai or Executive 
Comm.ittee 
7. Specializaion of the planning functions . 95 
VI. Japan 1 s Industrial PoliTer 
1. Japanese industrial capacity. 
From 1870, up to the present" steel production of 
the world has been estimated at about 6,ooo,ooo,ooo tons. 
One third of this amount has been produced within the last 
ten years. This recent increase in production shows that 
steel production is not so much for military needs but 
rather necessitated by the mechanization of industries. In 
our way of living, we are using more and more products made 
of steel. To measure the industrial power of a nation by 
the production of steel is not meaningless . 
The production of the Japanese steel industries 
surpassed that of the French in 1960, and went further than 
that of the R.ritain in 1961. Japan's current production of 
steel is 28 million tons , the fourth largest in the world . 
In the pre-1·1ar age, the steel productj_on of the Japanese steel 
mills was just enough to mee t the requirement of ~unitions . 
The markets of these steel mills changed completely during 
the post1var era . Construction, steelmakers, metalware, 
machinery industries, automotive industries, and other 
domestic consumers purchase roughly 70 % of their production 
and the rest of the 30 % is for exports . In 1959, Japan 
exported 1,8o4,ooo tons of steel with a value of 291 million 
dollars . The major consumers of Japanese steel abroad are 
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the United States, India, the Phil ippines, China, Thailand, 
and Brazil . The Japanese steel industri es are abl e to 
surmount the natural handicap of costly raw materi als by ex-
tensive modernization , low wages, l ar ge scale operation. 96 
Among the numerous steel production companies, Yawata, 
Fuji, Nippon, Sumitomo , Kawazaki, and Kobe are the six 
largest producing more than 80 % of the total J apanese steel 
production. As to their technology and facilities, the top 
eX3cut i ve of Yawata Company, the largest steel company in 
Japan, once said: n We feel that our Tobata steel works ' is 
advanced as any steel mill in the world and perhaps even 
f urther advanced ." 97 
The second 1.mrld war destroyed the Japanese navy. 
The Japanese shipbuilding industries were prohibited from 
constructing any ocean-going vessels i mmediatel y after the 
war. The Japanese shipbuilding industry started i n the 
middle of the nineteenth century with the assistance of the 
western engineers when the policy of seclusion was lifted . 
The Japanese navy encourgaed, aided and fostered the growth 
of the Japanese shipbuilding industry. With this assistance 
and help , the shipbuilding industry of Japan was able to 
acquire a rea sonabl e proficiency before World War II. 
The war isolated the industry from the new techniques 
developed abroad and caused the industry to overvrork aging 
facilities . War damages added to their difficulties . 
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After the war, the shipbuilding industry started 
again from scratch. In 1950, the Korean conflict broke out 
and the ban on the construction of ocean-going vessels by 
Japanese shipbuilding industry was lifted . Nodernization of 
facilities, and introduction of latest techniques of ship-
building boom in this era . From 1955 on all the yards were 
filled with orders from shipowners at home and . abroad . 
The yards and facilities of the Japanese shipbuilders are 
completely modernized and their operations thoroughly stream-
lined . They have efficient mechanics and highly trained naval 
architects . Low prices , quick delivery , and efficient service 
have \von them more international customers than the shipbuilding 
industry of any other country. . From 1955 to 1959 , the 
Japanese yards exported about 6,200,000 gros s tons of vessels 
of. various kinds , with a total value of more than $1,700 mil- · 
liom. 
In 1959, the Japanese yards turned out 887 vessels 
amounting to 1,799,000 gross tons . Out of all the ships 
built, 78 vessels with a total tonnage of 1,089,000 gross 
tons, vlhich accounts 60 % of the yearly production, were 
exported . The classification of export vessels by owners 
shows .that Southeast Asian countries occupy 43 %, Greece 
25 %, and the United States 20 %. 
Because of their geographical location and their 
underdeveloped shipbuilding industry, Southeast Asian 
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TABLE 3 
VESSELS ORDERED 
IN 1959 CLASSIFIED BY-NATIONS( ADOPTED )98 
J Nations Vessels Gross tons ~ 
I Greece 7 81,900 25 I u.s-. 3 69,250 20 
I Southeast -Asian 
: Countries 
I 
I 
I Taii.·ran 1 700 Paldstan l 8 ,700 I 
f 
India 1 6,400 
Philippines l3 105,000 I Hong Kong l 9, 500 ! T.otal 17 140,350 43 I 
I European 
Countries . 34,150 10 
-Latin AID.erican 
Countries 6 6,300 2 
countries are still an important purchaser of Japanese 
export vessels • . ·Export vessels occupy an enormously i m-
portant position in Japan ' s shipbuilding.99 
Rolling stock industry in Japan began as early 
as 1872. In order to extend the railway mileage in the 
country, the Japanese· rolling stock industry was originally 
monopolized by the government . By the turn of the century, 
Japan was produci~g more locomotives and passenger cars 
than they could use at home . In 1912, upon the request 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
---
I 
148 
of the industrial leaders, the J apanese government gave up 
the monopoly on the rolling stock industry and let private 
firms manufacture all the rolling stock. The government 
p lants were limited to r epair work . 
Japan National Railway .Company owned by the 
government consumes nearly 70% of the total production of 
the domestic rolling stock industry. . The technical labo-
ratory of Japan National Railway Company , which is the most 
complete laboratory in the country , carries on re search not 
only in rolling stock but also in every thing connected \vi th 
r.ailway ·technology . Its researchers work jointly with the 
engineers of private concerns . Among the twenty fairly 
large private concerns producing rolling stock, there are 
four l arg e firms capitali zed at $ 30,000 ,000 or more . 
These four are Hitachi Limited ( affilia ted company of 
Fujita Zaibatsu) , Tokyo Shibaura Electric ( affiliated 
company of Hitsui Zaibatsu) , Shin Hitsubishi Heavy Industry( 
affiliated company of L'~itsubishi Zaibatsu), and Mitsubishi 
Electric ( affiliated company of Mitsubishi Zaibatsu.) 
The production of the past few years as follows . The pro-
duction figures show that the J apanese rolling stock industry · 
has been followlng the trend of the world very closely. 
The produc t ion of steam locomotives has gradually dropped 
off and the production of Diesel cars and electric cars is 
increasing . From their production and their ability to 
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TABLE 4 
JAPAN'S ROLLING ST OCK PRODUCTION 
FOR FISCAL YEARS .l956-l959, INCLUSIVE( ADOPTED )100 
[Year Steam Elect . Diesel Elect. Freight 
Locomotive Locomotive Cars Cars Cars 
P-956 173 63 18 1,323 4,546 
P-957 18 83 30 1,666 9,456 
U.958 14 101 109 1,597 4,148 
1959 9 35 116 1,297 4,271 
follow the changes, we al so know that their industry is 
fairly established . The export of the J apanese rolling 
stock ranges from 30 % to 10 % of their total domestic 
production. Their majo r customers are the Southeast Asian 
~ .. 
nations . J apan exported $ 7,912 million of rolling stock 
in 1959 .101 
Probably no country could challenge the automotive 
supremacy of the United States in this generation. The best 
that any nation could hope f or is the second place, and even 
then the gap is great . However, Japan's automotive industry 
has been ambitious enough to compete ,.n_ th Britain , West 
Germany , and France for the second place . 
Bef ore the end of World vlar II, Japan's automotive 
industry produced only trucks and buses either fo r military 
use or f or public transportation. The legislations of 
Military Vehicle Subsidy Acts and the outbreak o.f the 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Sino-Japanese War increased the demand for motor vehicles 
for military use. In 1941, the national production of 
vehicles reached the prewar peak of 43,878 vehicles, but 
fully 98 % were trucks . Japan• s automotive plants \vere 
mostly destroyed in the war . The reconstruction of the auto-
motive industry soon began as the war ended. The outbreak 
of Korean conflict helped the growth of the newly reconstructed 
industry immensely. Large orders for vehicles were placed 
by the United States armed forces . Heamvhile , makers began 
taking steps to produce long neglected passenger cars. 
In 1953 , they concluded technical cooperation agreements 
with foreign producers, and rapidly increased investments in 
industrial facilities. In 1953, the national production of 
vehicles easily vrent beyond the prevrar peak and reached 
59,000 vehicles . Both the investment in the industrial 
facilities and production of passenger cars have been in-
creasing eversince . In 1959, the industry produced 297 ,000 
vehicles including 88 ,000 passenger cars . The production of 
Japan 1 s eix leading auto makers wa s as follmvs in 1959. 
The automotive industry is one of the fastest gro\dng 
indust.ries and a very i mportant segment of the economy of 
J apan)02 
Electricity has generally been the motive power 
f or industries . Po-vrer generation and industrialization 
always go hand in hand . Without a well developed system of 
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TABLE 5 
VK'"liCLE PRODUCTION OF 
THE SI.I>. LElilliNG AUTOKAKERS OF JAPAN IN 1959 (ADOPTED) .l03 
4 wheel Passenger 
Names o·f comnany vehi cles cars 
Toyota 112,546 31,130 
Nissan 84,18~ 33,016 
Isuzu 24,73 4,608 
Fuji Precision 22 , 131 7,098 
Hi no 11,075 6,403 
Tokyo Kogyo 15' 303 
power generation, industri ~lization can not be very successful . 
To generate electrical povrer, it is necessary to have gener-
tors, motors, transformers, circuit breakers and their 
accessories . Although the Japanese electrical machinery 
industry started as early as 1873, yet for generators and 
co~panion units Japan was depending upon ioports from the 
western countries until 1920. After the First 'ltlorld War, 
Japan's electrical machinery plants became more and more 
proficient. By the time of World War II, it has grown 
sufficiently to rank vli th the 1orld 1 s best . Japan \.Vas able 
to build 100,000 KV hydroelectric generators a t the Suifeng 
dam across the Yale river on the Korean ~nd anchurian border • 
. The damage suffered in the electrical machinery industry 
du-ring World War II was severe . In the first few years of 
the postwar reconstruction, the electric machinery \vorks 
did little beyond repairing damaged machines . As power v1as 
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an absolute prerequisite for recovery of the nation's in-
dustries , the restoration and building of ne1v pm.rer facilities 
had to be accomplished speedily. Greater efforts were given 
each year and the industry nm.; forged ahead of all other 
industries . In these few years , the electrical machinery 
industry has grmm tremendously. The production of heavy 
electrical machinery in the past four years is as follovTs . 
TABLE 6 
JAPAN'S PRODUCTION 
OF HEAVY ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 
FOR THE FISCAL Y&\RS 1956-1959, I NCLUSI VE (Adopted )l04 
Value: l million Japanese yen 
I Kinds of Hachines 1956 19'57 . 197'8 197'9 
Boiler 7,507 12,659 20,691 23,lfo4 
Steam Turbine 1,776 5, 425 8,630 7,211 
I 
Water Wneels 2,494 2,377 ~,861 4,073 
D. C. Generator 1,788 2,492 ,716 4,734 
A. C. Generator 4 ,155 7' 581 11,01~ l3,69lt 
D. C. Jv'otors 2,113 9 ,164 13,27 10,::364 
A. C. Hotors 27,230 42,676 33 , 555 43,276 
Transf ormers 16,815 29,408 26 , 588 30,736 
Circuit Breaker 5,237 9,105 10,007 9,049 
Heavy el ectrical machinery requires enormous pro-
duction facilities and hence large concerns . Following are 
the six large electrical machinery manufacturers in Japan . 
Hitachi and Tokyo Shibaura a re among the l argest general 
machinery works . Electrical machinery and equipment are 
only part of their business . The rest of the six specialize 
in heavy electrical machinery. There are also 3J O smaller 
! 
~----~-------------------------------------------------~-------------~1 
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TABLE 7 
JAPAN' S SIX L HGE 
HEAVY ELECTRICAL MACHI NERY MANUFACTURERsl05 
Name of company 
Hitachi Ltd. 
Tokyo Shibaura 
Hitsubishi Electric 
Fuji Denki 
Meidensha 
Ya sukawa Electric. 
Capital ( million yen) 
50,000 
25,000 
12, 800 
5,4oo 
2,4oo 
2,300 
scale firms which special i ze in welding machines and moto'r 
driven tools, working under subcontract with giant conce rns.l06 
The development of J apan's electronic industry has 
amazed the world . Following are the amounts of electronic 
products produced in 1955-1959. 
TABLE 8 
JAPAN 'S PRODUCTION OF 
ELECTRONI C PRODUCTS FOR 
THE FISCAL YEARS 1955-1959 ( adopted ).l07 
* Radi os, TV sets by 1000 pc . unit 
* Industrial instruments, radar, wireless shown by value 
* Value : 1 mi l lion yen ( 360 yen: 1 dollar) 
~' arne of _roduct 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 , adio 1,789 2,981 3 ,577 4, 897 10,025 
T V set 137 312 613 1,205 2, 872 
Industrial 
instruments 2, 88 5 5,484 
Radar 357 591 
ireless 3,980 5, 850 
9,156 
808 
7,941 
7,501 . 10,356 
795 . 1,857 
8 ,356 8,988 
I 
I 
1 
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These production figures indicate that the electronic 
industry in Japan has grown more than five times in the pa st 
few years . The development of transistor radios has given 
a new impetus to the industry. In 1959 , Japan produced 
6,146,000 units of transistor radios valued at $ 93,580,000. 
The production of transistor radios in 1960 is estimated at 
9,ooo,ooo units worth$ 130,ooo,ooo. United States is Japan 1 s 
only competitor in this· field . 
Japan 1 s telecasting began in February 1953 vnth less 
than 800 sets in the whole country. Production of television 
receivers began immediately and the yearly output has risen 
continuously. The prices have kept on coming down until 
no\v most Japanese families can afford a TV set. Japan is the 
third nation in the vTOrld to start color telecasting, af ter 
United States and Cuba. Japan is second only to United States 
as a producer of television sets . 
Production has also beGn striving electronic industrial 
instruments, reflecting the progress of industrial automation. 
There are t\vo types of electronic computers , analog and digital . 
Japan has already entered the production of analog computers . 
In 1958, 70 units of analog computers were produced; 79 units 
in 1959; and 87 units in 1960. These computers are being 
manufactured by the giant companies such as Hitachi, Toshiba, 
Mitsubishi , and Nippon Electric . 
There are about 1 ,600 electronic firms in the country 
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but most of the :' irms are of small scale . Big firms, such 
as Hitachi , Toshiba, l·:itsubishi , Fuji, consider themselves 
heavy electrical machinery builders rather than the producers 
of smaller electronic units which are produced by one of their 
divisions . Other prominent :inns that speciali ze in the elec-
tronics and light electrical appliances a re Nippon Electric, 
?uji Telecommunications, Hatsushita ·lectric, Nippon Radio, 
and Yokokai•Ta Denki . 1 ost of the small f irms specialize in a 
few items or are. working for the l a rge concerns a s sub-
contractors . Some specialize in j t:.s t part s. The clas sifi -
cation of electronics producers by scale is as follows . 
TABLE 9 
PRODUCERS OF ELECTRONIC PRODUCTs08 CLASSIFIED BY SCALE I N 1959 1 
~ Under 1 million yen 1 million- ¥ 2 million 2 nillion- ¥ 5 million 5 nc_ llion -¥ 10 million 
¥ 10 million - ¥ 50 million 
50 million -¥ 100 million 
100 million-¥ 1 billion 
Over 1 billion 
Unknown 
Total 
Number of firms 
595 
258 
212 
l.f-7 
76 
7 
16 
7 
376 
1,594 . 
Hechanization of manufacturing fabrics started in 
1857 in Ja~an . The modern technology of textile industry 
was i mY) orted from England • ..rhich was then the l argest producer 
• 
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of fabrics in the vlorld . But in 1933, Japan ' s textile 
industry was so developed that the amount of their export 
fabrics surmounted that of Bri tain and Japan's textile 
inc.ustry led the vrorld . In 1957, there vrere 36,176 factories 
producing fabrics. The national production of fabrics wa s 
5,307,625 square meters and the total yarn produced wa s 
1,123,774 tons in 1959. 109 Japan produces neither cotton 
nor wool. Japan's textile industry depends entirely upon 
the imported raw materials which are very costly. With 
advanced technology and modernized plants, Japan's textile 
industry ha s been able to thrust their products into the 
world market . Japan's textile industry has also made a large 
step in the manufacturing of synthetics. Toyo rayon Company, 
vlhich is a subsidiary company of Nitsui Zaibatsu, and the 
largest synthetic producer in the country, produced 30,000 
tons in 1959 and ranked third in the production of synthetic 
products of the world.110 
The necessity has compelled Jap an to develop chemical 
fertilizers as one of her major industries. Japan has only 
a limited area of a rable lands but has an expanding population 
to be fed·. Japan is blessed vli th an abundant resources of 
sulphur,;. lvhich is a ma jor material for manufacturing of ni-
trogenous fertilizer. To t ake advantage of the surplus 
supply of the hydroelectric power , many fertilizer producers 
adopted the electro-analysis in their manufacturing process . 
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As all industries have been developing rather rapidl y, so 
the demand for electricity has soon ou t grown the sea sonal 
su r plus of hydroelectric power . Many f ertilizer plants 
built in recent years have to adopt the gas method, u sing 
coal and coke for synthesizing ammonia. In 1959, J apan's 
fertilizer industry produced 970 , 578 tons of chemical ferti-
lizers · and ranked third after the United States and Germany. 
The production capacity of Japan's fertilizer plants have 
gone beyond their domestic needs . The industry is still 
expanding the plants and increasing the national output ~ 
Communist China , India , Korea, and Formosa have been the 
major customers of Japan's export fertilizers. The need 
for ferti l i zers among all the southeast Asian nations is 
roughly estimated at about 4,ooo,ooo tons of which only one 
third is locally produced and the rest i mported from J apan, 
Germany, and the United States . 111 
2 . Japan's role in Asia . 
Outside of Japan, science and technology are still 
not very commonly known to the people of Asia . Agriculture 
remains the basis of their economy. The percentage of people 
engaged in agriculture , though it differs by area, is more 
than 60%, ~Dd in ·some areas it is as high as 90 % •
. Japan neither produces enough food for her people 
nor has sufficient natural re sources for her gr owing 
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industries . . The geographical location o:f Japan has caused 
her to be deeply associated \vi th other Asian nations. Nore 
than 30% o:f Japan 1 s export go to these Asian countries. More 
than half o:f Japan 1 s imports come :from these same countries. 
Japan imports rice :from her neighbors such as Thailand, 
Burma , Indo-china, and Formosa, the i mportant rice exporting 
countries in the area . In order to produce more rice :for 
export, these nations, in return, purchase more fertilizers 
from Japan . Annually, Japan imports 1,ooo,ooo tons of sugar 
o:f which 30 % comes from her sian neighbors . Rubber, jute, 
cotton produced by the Asian nations are shared by Japan 
and the western countries. The mineral resources o:f Asia, 
such as iron ores o:f India, Halaya, and the Philippines; 
coal :fror.1 the China mainland ; tin :from Malaya and Indo-china, 
largely provide the need of the Japanese industries and in 
return J a pan ships steel, vessels, rolling stock, automobiles, 
machinery, electrical appliances, :fabrics, and chemical 
'goods to these Asian countries.112 
Having been colonies for centuries in the past, 
these nations are rather weak in their economic structures. 
Without many industries of their own, these nations must 
depend upon the industrialized nations, which would buy 
their ra\v materials and sell them the industrial goods at 
a reasonable price. Yet, the purchasing power of these 
nations is weak and their economy is shaky. The raw materials 
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available for exports are rather limited and their populations 
are growing a t a f a st rate . In order to strengthen the e-
conomy of these Asian nations so t hat they can be a strong 
support of Japan's growing industries, Japan should assist 
these nations develop their resources and establish their 
industr ies.·. The rela tionship of geographical location and 
economical interdependence between J apan and other Asian 
nations have. caused Japan to play . a great part in the 
industrialization of these , sian nations . 
3. Relation of industrial growth to management 
(1). Evolution 
The idea of management aas existed eversince human 
beings have congregated f or economic and social purposes. 
In the Bi~e, we read tha t Moses chose able men to become 
heads . Some ruled thousands; some directed hundreds; and 
some led tens. They judged their subordinates at all 
sea sons . For the difficult and more wei ghty affai rs, they 
came to Hoses, but for small matters they judged t hemselves . 113 
In the 19th century, these ideas of management evolved as a 
field of study. Early in the nineteenth cen tury, a Br itish 
mathematician by the name of Cha r1es Babbage perceived that 
the methods of science and mathematics could be applied to 
the operation of factor i es . He recomnended that accurate 
observation, exact measu rement and precise knowl edge of situ-
ations should be substituted for the traditional guess-work, 
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intuition and opinions in making dec i sions . The growth of 
indu stries caused the expansion of factories . This expansion 
brought not only a relatively l a rge concentration of men and 
materials in one place but also the problems of hovr to 
organize and control them. In the beginning more attention 
wa s given to machi nes than to \vorkers . There was no standard 
of worker's hours or vrork, while the factories desired only 
to increase their output . Labor was hard and workers were 
miserabl e . 
In 1903 and 1911 , Frederic W. Taylor pr e sented to 
the erican Socie t y of Hechanical Engineering the paper on 
shop management and principles of scientific manag ement . 
The r e he expressed his original concepts of wag e payment, 
worker selection and t r aining, and vro rk measurement s f or 
the p~rpose of setting standards . 114 His original ideas 
were devel oped rai,dl y by the gro\vth of mass produc t ion 
industry i n this century. In the past decade, evolution 
in the management practice is observed in the f ollovTing 
directions . 
1 . Development of the personnel function . 
2. Decentral i za tio::1 of ma.nagemen t and operation. 
3. Increased recognition and application of 
general principles of organization . 
4. Creation of new units of organization to 
meet increasing economic and social 
responsibilities . 
5. Improvement of techniques f or policy 
formulation and execution. ll5 
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(2) . The need of good management concept to support 
industrial grmvth . 
The failure or success of a company is largely 
attributed to the management of the company. It is, thus, 
necessary for the management to maintain its compe tency and 
efficiency in order to keep the company competitive . 
Evolving technology , developing science and advancing civi-
lization are causing dr~natic changes in industry. Com-
munication systems are amazingly improved . Products a re 
greatly diversified , and the sizes of operations are grovdng 
rapidly . 
We have also observed changes in the economic 
structures and social orders . Democracy takes the place of 
aristocracy. The gap between the poor and the rich is 
gradually shortened . Mechanization and talents are more 
emphatically sought than ever before .· In order to meet 
the climate of the society and to f ace the temperament of 
the age , the management should always adjust itself to the 
situation so that the management can maintain its comp etency 
and its efficiency under the given surroundings . 
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